Vous pouvez contribuer simplement à Wikibéral. Pour cela, demandez un compte à adminwiki@liberaux.org. N'hésitez pas !

James M. Buchanan (Bibliographie)

De Wikiberal
Aller à la navigation Aller à la recherche

Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de James M. Buchanan, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

Années 1950

  • 1950, "Federalism and fiscal equity”. American Economic Review, Vol 40, n°4, pp583–599
  • 1952, "The Pricing of Highway Services", National Tax Journal, Vol 5, n°2, June, p106
  • 1954,
    • a. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market", Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62, August, pp334-343
    • b. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets", Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62, pp114-123
    • c. avec C. L. Allen, M. R. Colberg, "Prices, Income, and Public Policy", New York: McGraw-Hill
      • Seconde édition en 1959
  • 1958,
    • a. “Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol 24, pp259–270
    • b. "The Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy", University of Virginia News Letter, Vol 35, n°2, pp5–9
  • 1959, “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Welfare Economics", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 2, n°1, pp124-138

Années 1960

  • 1960,
    • a. "La scienza delle finanze”: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory. In: Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Selected Essays. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, pp24-74
    • b. Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
    • c. avec Silvia Boba, "Economic policy, free institutions and democratic process", Il Politico, Vol 25, n°2, Juin, pp265-293
  • 1962,
    • a. avec Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
      • Nouvelle édition en 1999, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis
    • b. "The Relevance of Pareto Optimality", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (4): 341-354
    • c. "Easy Budgets and Tight Money", Lloyds Bank Review, Vol 64, avril, pp17-30
    • d. avec William C. Stubblebine, "Externality", Economica N.S. 29: 371-84
      • Repris en 1973, In: Robert Staaf et Francis Tannian, Dir., Externalities. New York: Dunnellen
    • e. "Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Policy", In: Leland Yeager, dir., In: "Search of a Monetary Constitution". Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp155-181
    • f. "Politics, Policy, and the Pigouvian Margins", Economica, Vol 29, n°113, February, pp17–28
  • 1963,
    • a. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes", Journal of Political Economy, 71, octobre, pp457-469
    • b. "Sovranità nazionale, pianificazione nazionale e libertà economica", Il Politico, n°1: La ricomparsa della pianificazione economica in occidente, pp121-
  • 1964,
    • a. “What Should Economists do?”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol XXX, n°3, pp213-222
    • b. "Are rational economic policies feasible in western democratic countries? / Ê possibile attuare delle politiche economiche razionali nei paesi democratici occidentali?", Il politico, vol 29, n°4, dicembre, pp801-817
  • 1965,
    • a. "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica, Vol 32, pp1-14
      • Repris en 1973, In: Robert Staaf et Francis Tannian, Dir., Externalities. New York: Dunnellen
      • Repris en 1988, In: The Theory of Market Failure, Tyler Cowen, Dir., Fairfax, VA, George Mason University Press, pp193-208
    • b. "Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers", Ethics, Vol 76, October, pp1–13
    • c. "Are Rational Economic Policies Feasible in Western Democratic Countries?", Il Politico, n°2: Nuovi studi sulla pianificazione, pp13-
      • Traduction en italien en 1965, "È possibile attuare delle politiche economiche razionali nei paesi democratici occidentali?", Il Politico, n°2: Nuovi studi sulla pianificazione, pp21-
    • d. "The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service", Londres: Institute of Economic Affairs
  • 1967,
    • a. Politics and Science: Reflections on Knights Critique of Polanyi, Ethics, 77 (4): 303-310
    • b. Public finance in democratic process: Fiscal institutions and individual choice, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press
  • 1968,
    • a. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago: Rand McNally
    • b. An Economic Approach to ‘Scientific Politics’
      • Repris en 1979, In: James M. Buchanan, What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press.Buchanan, pp143-159
    • c. Frank H. Knight, In: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: MacMillan, pp424–428
    • d. “A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing”, Public Choice, 5, pp1-17

Années 1970

  • 1970, avec Nicos E. Devletoglou, "Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis", Basic Books: New York


  • a. "Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller, et al. v. Schoene", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 15, n°2, pp439-452
  • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, dir., "Theory of public choice, political applications of economics", University of Michigan Press, Ann Harbor
  • c. Before Public Choice, In: Gordon Tullock, dir., "Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy", Blacksburg, Va.: Center for the Study of Public Choice
  • d. avec Charles J. Goetz, "Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility", Journal of Public Economics, 1: 25-43
  • e. "Toward analysis of closed behavioral systems", In: James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, dir., "Theory of public choice, political applications of economics", University of Michigan Press, Ann Harbor, pp11–23


  • a. “The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State", Natural Resources Journal, Vol 13
  • b. "America’s Third Century in Perspective", Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol 1, November, pp3–12
  • d. "The Institutional Structure of Externality", Public Choice, Vol XIV, Spring


  • a. avec Winston Bush, "Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution", The American Economic Review, Vol 64, n°2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, pp153-157
  • b. Commentaire sur le livre de David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism," The Journal of Economic Litterature, Vol. X11, No. 3 (1974). p915
  • c. Good Economics-Bad Law, Virginia Law Review, 60(3): 483-492
  • d. "Hegel and the Calculus of Voting", Public Choice, Sping, pp99-101


  • a. avec Gordon Tullock, "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes." American Economic Review 65: 139-47
  • b. avec Warren J. Samuels, On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence, Journal of Economic Issues 9: 15-38
  • c. A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory, The American Economic Review, 65 (2), May, pp225-230
  • d. The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective: A comment, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3): 903-905
  • f. "The Samaritan’s Dilemma", In: E.S. Phelps, dir., "Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory", New York: Russell Sage Foundation
  • g. "Public Finance and Public Choice", National Tax Journal, Vol 28, n°4, pp383–394


  • a. "The Justice of Natural Liberty", The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 5, n°1, Jan, pp1-16
    • Repris en 1978, In: Fred Glahe, dir., "Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations: Bicentennial Essays 1776–1976", Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, pp61–81
    • Repris en 1979, In: Gerald O’Driscoll, dir., "Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy", Ames: Iowa State University Press, pp117–131
    • Repris en 1987, In: Robert D. Tollison, Viktor Vanberg, dir., "Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy", College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp253–268
  • b. "Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem", Journal of Political Economy, vol.84, pp.337-342
  • c. Taxation in Fiscal Exchange, Journal of Public Economics 6 (juillet-August), pp17-29
  • e. Public Goods and National Liberty, In: T. Wilson and A. Skinner, Dir., The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 271-286
  • f. avec Nicolaus Tideman, "Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority", In: Henry G. Manne, Roger Miller, dir., "Gold, Money and the Law", Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., pp9-69
  • g. "Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security: A Comment", Journal of Political Economy, 84(2), pp337–342
  • h. "Adam Smith on Public Choice", Public Choice, Vol 25, spring, pp81–82


  • b. dir., "Freedom in Constitutional Contract", College Sta., Tex.: Texas A&M University Press
  • c. "Law and the invisible hand", In: James M. Buchanan, dir., "Freedom in Constitutional Contract", College Sta., Tex.: Texas A&M University Press
  • e. A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle, In: Freedom in Constitutional Contract, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp194—211
  • f. Good Economics - Bad Law, Freedom in Constitutional Contract, Chapter 3, Texas, A&M University, pp40-49
  • g. "Letter to Professor Vincent Ostrom", Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University


  • d. avec Richard E. Wagner, "Dialogues concerning fiscal religion", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 4, n°3, pp627-636


  • a. "The Potential for Taxpayers Revolt in American Democracy", Social Science Quarterly, Vol 59, n°1, mars, pp691-696
  • b. What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press
  • c. Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors, In: James M. Buchanan, Dir., What Should Economists Do?, Indianapolis, Liberty Press, pp115-142
  • d. The general implication of subjectivism in economics, In: What Should Economists Do?, James Buchanan, Dir., Indianapolis: Liberty Press, pp81–92
  • e. Constitutional Constraints on Governmental Taxing Power, Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol 30, Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, New York
  • f. "Natural and artifactual man",
    • Repris en 1999, In: "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty", Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, pp246‒259
  • g. "Politics without romance"
    • Repris en 1999, In: "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty", Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, pp45‒59

Années 1980


  • a. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • c. avec A. Di Pierro, "Cognition, Choice and Entrepreneurship", Southern Economic Journal, Vol 46, n°3, pp693-701
  • d. "Reform in the rent-seeking society", In: James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock, dir., "Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society", College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp359–367
  • e. avec Roger L. Faith, “Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules", Economic Inquiry, Vol 18, n°1, pp23–38


  • a. avec Roger L. Faith, "Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities", The Journal of Law and Economics, Apr, Vol 24, n°1, pp95-111
  • b. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "The Normative Purpose of Economic ‘Science’: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method", International Review of Law and Economics, Vol 1, n°2, December, pp160-


  • a. avec Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, n°4, Aug., pp816-819
  • b. avec Dwight R. Lee, Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium, Economic Inquiry 20, n°3, juillet, pp344-354
  • d. “Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence”, Literature of Liberty, Vol 5, n°4, pp5-


  • a. "Monetary Research, Monetary Rules, and Monetary Regimes", Cato Journal, Vol 3, Spring, pp143—46
  • b. "Rights, Efficiency and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transaction Costs"
    • Repris en 1985, In: Liberty, Markets and State. Nueva York: New York University Press
  • c. "Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26, n°1, pp71—85
  • d. "The Public Choice Perspective", Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 1, n°1, pp7–15
    • Traduit en islandais en 1983, "Undir sjonarhorni almannavalsfraedinnar", Frelsid, Vol 4, n°2, pp106–117



  • a. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • b. dir., "Liberty. Market and State", New York: New York University Press
  • c. "Cultural evolution and institutional reform", In: James M. Buchanan, dir., "Liberty, Market and State", New York: New York University Press, pp75-85


  • a. "The Constitution of Economic Policy", American Economic Review, Vol 77, n° 3, pp243-250
  • b. "Constitutional Economics", In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman, dir., "The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics", Vol I, London: Macmillan, pp585–588
  • c. Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect, Cato Journal, Vol 7, pp305-312
  • d. avec R. L. Faith, Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit, American Economic Review, Vol 77, n°5
  • e. Keynesian Follies, In: David A. Reese, dir., The Legacy of Keynes, San Francisco: Harper and Row, pp130–145
  • f. "Comment: Constitutional srategy and the moneary regime", In: James A. Dorn et Anna J. Schwartz, dir., "The Search for Stable Money: Essays on Monetary Reform", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp119-128
  • i. "Justification of the compound republic: the calculus in retrospect", Cato Journal, Vol 7, n°2, pp305–312


  • a. “Contractarian political economy and constitutional interpretation”, The American Economic Review, 88 (2), pp135-139
  • b. “Political Economy: 1957–1982”, In: "Ideas, Their Origins, and Their Consequences", Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp119–130 (conférence donnée le 20 avril 1983)
  • c. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the ‘Noble’ Lie", Virginia Law Review, Vol 74, n°2, March, pp179-189
  • d. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "Besteuerung und Staatsgewalt. Analystische Grundlagen einer Finanzverfassung" ("Fiscalité et pouvoir de l'État. Fondements analytiques d'une constitution financière"), Hamburg: Steuer-und Wirtschaftsverlag


  • b. “Free Trade and Producer-Interest Politics”, In: Essays on the Political Economy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp52-66
  • c. avec Viktor Vanberg, "A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction", Public Choice, Vol 61, n°1, Apr., pp15-27
  • d. "Shackle and a lecture in Pittsburgh", Market Process, Vol 7, Spring, pp2–4
  • e. "Explorations into Constitutional Economics", Texas: Texas A&M University Press
  • f. "Essays on Political Economy", Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press

Années 1990

  • 1990,
    • a. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 1, n°1, pp1–18
      • Repris en 1995, In: Pal Foss, dir., "Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions", Ch 1, Aldershot
    • b. "Socialism Is Dead; Leviathan Lives", Wall Street Journal, editorial page, 18 juillet
    • c. avec Viktor Vanberg, "Rational Choice and Moral Order", In: J. H. Nichols Jr., C. Wright, dir., "From Political Economy to Economics – And Back?", San Francisco, Cal.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, pp175–191


  • a. Dir., "Constitutional Economics", Oxford, Basil Blackwell
  • b. avec Viktor Vanberg, "The Market as a Creative Process", Economics and Philosophy, Vol 7, pp167–186
    • Repris en 1994, In: D. M. Hausman, dir., The Philosophy of Economics, New York: Cambridge University, pp315-335
  • c. "The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order", Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
  • d. "Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp1-6
  • e. "The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy", In: James M. Buchanan, dir., "The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order", Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, pp3-18
  • f. avec Dwight R. Lee, "Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp139-161
  • g. avec Richard E. Wagner, John Burton, "The Consequences of Mr. Keynes", In: James Buchanan, dir., "Constitutional Economics", Oxford: Blackwell, pp91–112
  • h. "Constitutional Economics", In: John Eatwell et alii., dir., "The New Palgrave: The World of Economics", New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., pp134-142


  • a. "Better Than Plowing and Other Personal Essays", Chicago: University of Chicago Press
  • b. I Did Not Call Him “Fritz”: Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 3, pp129-135
    • Repris en 2004, In: John Wood, dir., Friedrich A. Hayek. Critical Assessments, Londres, Routledge, ch 13, pp238-243
  • c. "From the Inside Looking Out", In: Michael Szenberg, dir., "Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp98–106
  • d. avec Dwight R. Lee, "Private interest support for efficiency enhancing antitrust policies", Economic Inquiry, Vol 30, n°2, April, pp218-224


  • a. "How Can Constitutions Be Designed so that Politicians Who Seek to Serve 'Public Interest' Can Survive and Prosper?", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 4, pp1-6
  • b. Public Choice after Socialism, Public Choice, Vol 77, pp67-74
  • c. "Property as a Guarantor of Liberty", Brookfield, Vt..: Edward Elgar
  • e. "The Political Efficiency of General Taxation", National Tax Journal, Vol 46, December, pp404-410


  • a. "The return to increasing returns: An introductory summary", In: James Buchanan, Y. Yoon, dir., "The Return to Increasing Returns", University of Michigan Press, pp3-13
  • b. avec Dwight R. Lee, "On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union", Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 5, juin/septembre, pp219–32
  • c. avec Roger Congleton, "The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators", Public Choice, vol 79, pp47—60
  • e. "Ethics and Economic Progress", Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press


  • a. "The Metamorphosis of John Gray", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 6, n°3, pp293–295
  • b. "Federalism as an ideal political order and an objective for constitutional reform", Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 25, n°2, p19


  • a. "Post-Socialist Political Economy", Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing
  • b. "Europe as Social Reality", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, pp253-256
  • c. "Federalism and Individual Sovereignty", Cato Journal, Vol 15, n°2-3, Fall/Winter, pp259-268
  • d. "Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century", Asian Journal of Business & Information, Vol 1, pp5-10
  • e. "The Best of All Possible Worlds? New Efforts to Prove That Political Institutions Works as Well as Markets”, Times Literary Supplement, 26 janvier, n°4843, p13
  • f. "Adam Smith as inspiration", In: Byeong-Ho Gong, dir., "The Academic World of James M. Buchanan", Seoul: Korea Economic Research Institute (en coréen)
    • Traduit en anglais en 2001, "Adam Smith as Inspiration", In: "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan", Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund


    • a. "Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare?", In: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr et Jeffrey Paul, dir., "The Welfare State", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp165-179
    • b. "Beyond science: The economists' enterprise", In, Roger Koppl et Steven Horwitz, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol 4", Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp129-131


  • d. avec Roger Congleton, "Politics by Principle, Not Interest – Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


    • a. dir., The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan - Volume 1), Indianapolis, Liberty Fund
    • b. avec Yong J. Yoon, Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler’s Theorem, and Competitive Equilibrium, History of Political Economy, Fall, 31(3), pp511-523
    • c. Moral and Community in the Extended Market Order, In: Viktor Vanberg, dir., Freiheit, Wettbewerb und Wirtschaftsordnung. Hommage zum 100. Geburtstag von Friedrich A. von Hayek, Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg
    • d. Consumption without Production: The Impossible Idyll of Socialisms, In: Viktor Vanberg, dir., Freiheit, Wettbewerb und Wirtschaftsordnung. Hommage zum 100. Geburtstag von Friedrich A. von Hayek, Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg

Années 2000

  • 2000,
    • a. avec Yong J. Yoon, A Smithian perspective on increasing returns, J. His. Econ. Thought, 22, pp43-8
    • b. Explorations into Constitutional Economics, College Station: Texas A&M University Press
    • c. "The Soul of Classical Liberalism", The Independent Review, Vol 5, n°1, Summer, pp111-119
    • d. "Why constitutions matter", In: Niclas Berggren, N. Karlson & J. Nergelius, dir., "Why constitutions matter", Stockholm: City University Press, pp1–16
    • e. avec Yong J. Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons”, Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), pp1-13
    • f. "Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of John Maynard Keynes", Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
  • 2001,
    • a. “Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics”, Journal of Economic Methodology, March, 8(1), pp27-32
    • b. "My Intellectual Pilgrimage", Francisco Marroquín University
    • c. "The Potential for Tyranny in Politics as Science", In: Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt et Robert D. Tollison, dir., "Moral Science and Moral Order: The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume XVII, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp153–170
    • d. 'Criteria for a Free Society', On: "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan", vol. 18. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp173–184


  • a. "Natural equality, increasing returns, and economic progress: A re-interpretation of Adam Smith's system", Div. Labor Trans. Costs, Vol l, n°1
  • b. "Same Players, Different Game: How Better Rules Make Better Politics", In: Michael Wohlgemuth, dir., "Spielregeln für eine bessere Politik. Reformblockaden überwinden – Leistungswettbewerb fördern", Freiburg, Basel, Wien, pp25-35
  • c. "Why, I, Too, Am Not a Conservative", Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
  • d. "Afraid to be free: dependency as desideratum", Public Choice, Vol 124, n°1, pp19–31


  • a. avec Y. Yoon, "All voting is strategic", Public Choice, Vol 129, pp159–167


  • a. "Beyond Law – The Institutionalized Ethics of Liberal Order", In: Peter Gonda, Pavel Chalupnicek, dir., "In Defense of the Free Market", Bratislava: Conservative Institute


  • a. avec Yong J. Yoon, "Public Choice and the Extent of the Market", Kyklos, Vol 61, n°2, pp177-188
  • b. "Let us understand Adam Smith", Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol 30, n°1, pp21-28
  • c. "Italian fiscal theorists", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp258-260
  • d. "“Same Players, Different Game: How Better Rules Make Better Politics", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 19, n°3, pp171–179

Années 2010