Richard Wagner (bibliographie)

Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de Richard Wagner, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

De 1966 à 1969

• 1966, "Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article", commentaire du livre de Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action", Public Choice, Vol 1, Fall, pp161-170

• 1967, avec James M. Buchanan, Public Debt in a Democratic Society, Washington: American Enterprise Institute

De 1970 à 1974

• 1970, "Optimality in Local Debt Limitation." National Tax Journal 23 (septembre): 297-305
  • Repris en 1972, In: The Theory of Public Choice, ed. par James M. Buchanan et Robert D. Tollison, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 123-35
  • Repris en 1980, In: The Economics of Federalism, ed. by Bhajan S. Grewel, Geoffrey Brennan et Russel L. Mathews, Canberra: Australian National University Press, pp. 351-63

• 1971,
  • a. Optimality in Local Debt Limitation: Reply, National Tax Journal 24 (mars): 109-111
  • b. The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism, Chicago: Markham

• 1973,
  • a. "The Public Economy", Chicago: Markham
  • b. "Death and Taxes: Some Perspectives on Inheritance, Inequality, and Progressive Taxation", Washington: American Enterprise Institute
    • Repris en 1974, In: Perspectives on Tax Reform, Richard E. Wagner, et al, Dir., New York: Praeger, pp1-67

• 1974,
  • a Politics, Bureaucracy, and Budgetary Choice: A Review of the Brookings Budget for 1974, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, August, pp367-83
  • b. Perspectives on Tax Reform. New York: Praeger

De 1975 à 1979

• 1975,
  • a. avec Warren E. Weber, "Competition, Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 18, n°3, décembre, pp661-684
  • b. "The Antisocial Activities of the Public Sector", The Banker, Vol 125, décembre, pp1503-1511

• 1976,
  • a. Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, Public Choice 25 (Spring): 45-61
  • b. Institutional Constraints and Local Community Formation, American Economic Review, Proceedings, 66 (mai): 110-15
    • Traduit en italien en 1976, In: Problemi di Amminstrazione Pubblica (No. 4, 1976): 39-52
  • c. avec Gordon Tullock, Rational Models, Politics, and Policy Analysis, Policy Studies Journal 4 (Summer): 408-416

1977

• a. avec James M. Buchanan, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, New York: Academic Press
  • Traduction japonaise en 1979
  • Traduction coréenne en 1981
  • Traduction espagnole en 1983

• b. "Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications", Kyklos, Vol 30, n°3, pp395-410

• c. "Inheritance and the State: Tax Principles for a Free and Prosperous Commonwealth", Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
  • Reprise en 1983 du chapître 2, "The Egalitarian Imperative", In: William Letwin, dir., "Against Equality: Readings on Economic and Social Policy", London: Macmillan, pp297-312

• d. avec Warren E. Weber, "Wagner's Law, Fiscal Institutions, and the Growth of Government", National Tax Journal 30 (mars): 59-68

• e. "Tax Policy Toward Private Foundations: Confused Principles and Unfortunate Legislation", Policy Studies Journal, Vol 5, Spring, pp314-319

• f. "Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice: Reply", Public Choice, Vol 29, Spring, pp131-132

• g. "Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications", Kyklos, Vol 30, n°3, pp395-410

1978

• a. avec Dolores T. Martin, The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California, Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2): 409–425

• b. avec James Buchanan, John Burton, "The Consequences of Mr. Keynes", Hobart Paper 78, London: Institute of Economic Affairs
  • Extraits repris en 1981, In: David C. Collander, dir., "Solutions to Unemployment", New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp27-31
  • Traduction italienne en 1979, In: S. Carrubba et Domenico Da Empoli, dir., "La Scuola di Public Choice", Rome: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, pp217-251

• c. avec James M. Buchanan, "Democracy and keynesian constitutions: Political biases and economic consequences", In: James Buchanan, Richard E. Wagner, John Burton, dir., "The Consequences of Mr. Keynes", Hobart Paper n°78, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, pp11-28

• d. avec James Buchanan, John Burton,"Constitutional options for fiscal control", In: James Buchanan, Richard E. Wagner, John Burton, dir., "The Consequences of Mr. Keynes", Hobart Paper n°78, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, pp77-86

• e. avec James M. Buchanan, "Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy", Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff

• f. avec Gordon Tullock, "Policy Analysis and Deductive Reasoning", Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath

• g. avec James M. Buchanan, "Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 4, juillet, pp627-636
  • Traduit en espagnol en 1984, In: J. J. Fernandez Cainzos, dir., "La Economia del Deficit Publico", Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, pp263-283

• h. "Carl Menger's Contribution to Economics: Introduction", Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol 6, septembre, pp1-2

• i. "Carl Menger's Contribution to Economics: Final Remarks", Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol 6, septembre, pp65-69

1979

• • a. "Comment: Politics, Monetary Control, and Economic Performance," in Time, Uncertainty, and Disequilibrium. pp. 177-86. Edited by Mario Rizzo. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Co
  • b. The Tax Expenditure Budget: An Exercise in Fiscal Impressionism. Washington, DC: Tax Foundation
  • c. Government Aid to Private Schools: Is It a Trojan Horse? Wichita, KS: Center for Independent Education
  • d. avec Paul Craig Roberts, The Tax Reform Fraud, Policy Review (Summer): 121-39
  • e. "Legalized Counterfeiting", Policy reports, Vol 1, n°7, p1, pp3-5, p7

De 1980 à 1989

• 1980,
  • a. "Boom and Bust: The Political Economy of Economic Disorder", Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 4, Winter, pp1-37
    • Repris en 1984, In: James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, dir., "The Theory of Public Choice, II", Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp238-272
  • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, "Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution", Washington: Cato Institute
    • édition révisée en 1982
  • c. "Spending Limitation, the Constitution, and Productivity: A Response to James Tobin", Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol 3, Winter, pp59-67
  • d. "Sense versus Sensibility in the Taxation of Personal Wealth", Canadian Taxation: A Journal of Tax Policy, Vol 2, Spring, pp23-30

• 1982,
  • a. "The Enterprise System, Democracy, and the General Welfare: an Approach to Reconciliation", In: David G. Raboy, dir., "Essays in supply side economics", Washington, DC : Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation
  • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, Alvin Rabushka, John T. Noonan, "Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution", Washington, DC: Cato Institute

• 1983,
  • a. Funded Social Security: Collective and Private Options, Cato Journal 3 (Fall): 581-602
  • b. Public Finance: Revenues and Expenditures in a Democratic Society. Boston: Little, Brown
  • c. On Economics, Political Science, and Public Policy, Policy Studies Journal 12 (décembre): 251-57

• 1985,
  • a. A Reconsideration of Some Principles of Tax Reform, Florida Policy Review, 1, Spring, pp13-18
  • b. Tax Reform through Constitutional Limitation: A Sympathetic Critique, Cumberland Law Review, 15, n°2, pp475-97
  • c. Normative and Positive Foundations of Tax Reform, Cato Journal 5 (Fall): 385-99
  • d. avec Thomas S. McCaleb, The Experimental Search for Free Riders: Some Reflections and Observations, Public Choice, 47, n°3, pp479-90

• 1986,
  • a. Central Banking and the Fed: A Public Choice Perspective, Cato Journal, Vol 6, Fall, pp519-538
    • Repris In: Lawrence White, dir., Free Banking, Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
  • b. Wealth Transfers in a Rent-Seeking Polity, Cato Journal, 6, Spring/Summer, pp155-71
  • c. Rationalization Versus Explanation in the Political Economy of Wealth Transfers, Florida Policy Review, 2, Summer, pp30-37

• 1987,
  • a. "James M. Buchanan: Constitutional Political Economist", Regulation, Vol 11, février, pp13-17
  • b. avec Jürgen Backhaus, "The Cameralists: A Public Choice Perspective", Public Choice, Vol 53, n°1, pp3-20
  • c. "Courts, Legislatures, and Constitutional Maintenance", Cato Journal, Vol 7, Fall, pp323-329
  • d. "Gordon Tullock as rhetorical economist", In: Charles Rowley, dir., "Democracy and Public Choice, Essays in Honor of Gordon Tullock", Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp27-40
  • e. "Parchment, Guns, and the maintenance of constitutional contract", In: Charles Rowley, dir., "Democracy and Public Choice, Essays in Honor of Gordon Tullock", Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp105-121

• 1988,
  • a. avec Robert D. Tollison, Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking, and Public Policy, Lexington, MA: D.C. Health
  • b. avec James D. Gwartney, The Public Choice Revolution, The Intercollegiate Review, Volume 23, Number 2, Spring, pp17-26
  • c. avec James D. Gwartney, The Federal Budget Process: Why It Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed, Tallahassee, FL: James Madison Institute
  • d. avec James D. Gwartney, Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, Greenwich, CT: JAI press
  • e. The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective, Public Choice, 56, février, pp153-66
    • Repris en 1993, In: Public Choice Theory, Vol. III, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, pp413-26
  • f. Morals, Interests, and Constitutional Order, Oregon Law Review, 67, n°1, pp73-92
  • g. avec Robert D. Tollison, Social Cost, Rent Seeking, and Smoking, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 6, décembre, pp171-86
  • h. avec James D. Gwartney, "Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government", In: James Gwartney et Richard E. Wagner, dir., "Public choice and constitutional economics", Greenwich, Coon.: JAI Press et London: JAI Press, pp3—28

• 1989,
  • a. "To Promote The General Welfare: Market Processes vs. Political Transfers", San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute
  • b. Constitutional Order in a Federal Republic, Public Choice, 61, mai, pp187-92
  • c. Politics, Central Banking, and Economic Order, Critical Review, 3, Summer/Fall, pp11-22

De 1990 à 1994

• 1990,
  • a. avec Charles K. Rowley, Choosing Freedom: Public Choice and the Libertarian Idea, Liberty 3 (janvier): 43-45
    • Repris en 1993, In: Social Choice Theory, Vol. III, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
  • b. avec Mwangi Kimenyi, Robert D. Tollison, "Regulatory Finance in Alternative Models of Regulation: General Fund Financing Versus Earmarked Taxes", European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 6, n°4, pp519-529

• 1991,
  • a. avec Robert D. Tollison, The Economics of Smoking, Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff
  • b. Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice. London: Routledge
  • c. avec Robert D. Tollison, Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform, Kyklos, Vol 44, n°1, pp57-70
    • Repris en 1995, In: The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Robert D. Tollison et Roger D. Congleton, Dir., Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
  • d. avec Robert D. Tollison, Self Interest, Public Interest, and Public Health, Public Choice, Vol 69, n°3, pp323-43
  • e. avec Robert D. Tollison, The Logic of Natural Monopoly Regulation, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol 17, n°4, pp483-490

• 1992,
  • a. avec Karen Vaughn, Public Debt Controversies: An Essay in Reconciliation, Kyklos, Vol 45, n°1, pp57-70
  • b. Grazing the Budgetary Commons: The Rational Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility, Journal of Law and Politics, 9, Fall, pp105-19
  • c. Crafting Social Rules: Common Law vs. Statute Law, Once Again, Constitutional Political Economy, 3, Fall, pp381-97

• 1993,
  • a. Federal Transfer Taxation: A Study in Social Cost. Washington: Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation
  • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, Who Benefits from WHO? The Decline of the World Health Organization, London: The Social Affairs Unit
  • c. Parchment, Guns, and Constitutional Order. Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
    • Repris en 1993, In: Property Rights and the Limits of Democracy, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  • d. The Impending Transformation of Public Choice Scholarship, Public Choice, 77, pp203-12
  • e. Commentaire du livre de Gerard Radnitzky, dir., Universal Economics: Assessing the Achievements of the Economic Approach, Cato Journal 12, Winter, pp737-739

• 1994, "Economic Efficiency, Rent Seeking, and Democracy: Zenoistic Variations on Coaseian Themes", In: Peter J. Boettke, Mario J. Rizzo, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics", Vol 1, pp129-144

De 1995 à 1999

• 1995,
  • a. avec Charles K. Rowley et Willem Thorbecke, Trade Protection in the United States, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    • Traduction coréenne en 1998
  • b. A Competitive Federalism for the New Century, Madison Review, 1, Fall, pp34-40
  • c. Commentaire du livre de Tomas J. Philipson et de Richard A. Posner, Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 33, (septembre, pp1365-1367
  • d. Commentaire du livre de Mark Schneider, Paul Teske et Michael Mintrom, Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 6, Summer, pp203-204

• 1996,
  • a. Economic Policy in a Liberal Democracy, Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar
    • Repris en 1996, In: The Political Economy of the Minimal State, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  • b. Commentaire du livre de Donald Wittman, The myth of democratic failure, Constitutional Political Economy, 7, 153–160
  • c. Who Owes What, and to Whom? Public Debt, Ricardian Equivalence, and Governmental Form, Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 9, n°2, pp143-57
  • d. Federal Transfer Taxation: The Effect on Saving, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Dissipation, Family Business Review, Vol 9, Fall, pp269-83
  • e. Commentaire du livre de Donald A. Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, n°2, pp153-156
  • f. Commentaire du livre de Nicolai J. Foss, The Austrian School and Modern Economics: Essays in Reassessment, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, n°3, pp239-241

• 1997,
  • a. "Parasitical political pricing, economic calculation, and the size of government: Variations on a theme by Maffeo Pantaleoni", Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 15, pp135–146
  • b. "Choice, Exchange, and Public Finance", American Economic Review, Proceedings 87 (mai, pp160-63
  • c. avec Robert E. McCormick et Robert D. Tollison, Smoking, Insurance, and Social Cost, Regulation, Vol 20 (Summer, pp33-37
  • d. avec Mark Crain, Politics, Public Capital, and the Structure of Production, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 15, pp3-24
  • e. Parasitical Political Pricing, Economic Calculation, and the Size of Government: Variations on a Theme by Maffeo Pantaleoni, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 15, n°2-3, pp135-46

• 1998,
  • a. “Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 9, n°2, pp105-111
  • b. "The Constitutional Protection of Private Property", In: Peter Hill, Roger Meiners, dir., "Who Owns the Environment?", Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp315-336

• 1999,
  • a. avec Donald P. Racheter, Limiting Leviathan, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  • b. Understanding the Tobacco Settlement: The State as a Partisan Plaintiff, Regulation 22 (No. 4): 38-41
  • c. Austrian Cycle Theory: Saving the Wheat while Discarding the Chaff, Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 12, n°1, pp65-80
  • d. "Inheritance", In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., The Elgar Companion To Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing
  • e. Carl Menger (1840–1921), In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., The Elgar Companion To Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing

De 2000 à 2009

• 2000,
  • a. avec Edward J. McCaffrey, A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence from Death Taxation, Tax Notes 88, n°6, pp801-814
  • b. Austrian Cycle Theory: Saving the Wheat while Discarding the Chaff, Festschrift for James Buchanan
  • c. Commentaire du livre de David Schmidtz et de Robert E. Goodin, Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 13, n°1, pp97-100

• 2001,
  • a. "Competition as a Rivalrous Process: Attilio da Empoli and the Years of High Theory that Might Have Been", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol 28, n° 4/5, pp337-345
  • b. avec Donald P. Racheter, "Federalist Government in Principle and Practice", Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers

• 2002,
  • a. "Complexity, Governance, and Constitutional Craftsmanship", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 61, janvier, pp105-122
    • Repris en 2002, In: Laurence S. Moss, dir., "The New Political Economics", Oxford: Basil Blackwell
  • b. "Custom, Legislation, and Market Order", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 61, avril, pp563-569
  • c. "Some Institutional Problematics of Excess Burden Analytics", Public Finance Review, Vol 30, novembre, pp531-545
  • d. avec Donald P. Racheter, "Politics, Taxation, and the Rule of Law: The Power to Tax in Constitutional Perspective", Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers

• 2003,
  • a. avec Ryan D. Oprea, Institutions, Emergence, and Macro Theorizing: A Review Essay on Roger Garrison’s Time and Money, Review of Austrian Economics 16 (No. 1, 2003): 97-109
  • b. Happy Anniversary? Ninety Years of the Income Tax, The World and I (avril): 28-33
  • c. "Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance", Il Pensiero Economico, Vol 11, n°1, pp271-282

• 2004,
  • a. avec Jürgen G. Backhaus, Handbook of Public Finance, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
  • b. "Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise: Charlottesville, Blacksburg, and Fairfax Retrospectively Viewed", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 63, n°1, janvier, pp55-74
  • c. “Inefficient Market Pricing: An Illusory Economic Box” (avec Kevin Brancato). Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 22 (2004): 3-13.
  • d. Public choice as an academic enterprise: Charlottesville, Blacksburg, and Fairfax retrospectively viewed, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Jan

• 2005,
  • a. The World Health Organization: A Time for Re-Constitution. London: International Policy Network
  • b. State Excise Taxation: Horse-and-Buggy Taxes in an Electronic Age. Washington: Tax Foundation
  • c. Verizon and MCI: A Merger that Promotes Competition. Mt. Pleasant, IA: Public Interest Institute
  • d. “Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom’s Scholarly Œuvre”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 57, n°2, pp173-188
  • e. "Austrian Cycle Theory and the Prospect of a Coordinationist Macroeconomics", In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., Modern Applications of Austrian Thought, Routledge, pp60-121

• 2006, "Retrogressive Regime Drift within a Theory of Emergent Order", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 19, n°2–3, pp113–123

• 2007, "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance: An Exploratory Essay", Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar

• 2008,
  • a. "Finding social dilemma: West of Babel, not East of Eden", Public Choice, Vol 135, pp55-66
  • b. "TAXATION", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp499-501
  • c. "WICKSELL, KNUT (1851–1926)", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp543-544

• 2009,
  • a. "Elections as takeover bids: Some agonistics concerning good government", The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 22, n°2, June, pp145-150
  • b. avec Adam Martin, "Heterogeneity, Voting, and Public Policy", Public Finance and Management, Vol 9, pp393-415
  • c. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance: An Exploratory Essay", Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
  • d. "Property, State, and Entangled Political Economy", In: W. Schafer, A. Schneider, T. Thomas, dir., "Markets and Politics: Insights from a Political Economy Perspective", Marburg: Metropolis, pp37–49

De 2010 à 2019

• 2010,
  • a. "Change within permanence: time and the bivalent logic of economic analysis", In: Roger Koppl, Steven Horwitz, Pierre Desrochers, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics" - Volume 14 - "What is so Austrian about Austrian Economics?", ISBN: 978-0-85724-261-7, pp181-203
  • b. "Mind, Society, and Human Action: Time and Knowledge in a Theory of Social Economy", London, New York: Routledge

• 2011,
  • a. “Spontaneous Order, Liberty, and Austrian Economics“, Studies in Emergent Order, Vol 4, pp209-223
  • b. avec Giuseppe Eusepi, "States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises", Review of Political Economy, Vol 23, pp573–585
  • c. avec P. Runst, "Choice, emergence, and constitutional process: A framework for positive analysis", Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol 7, pp131–145

• 2012,
  • a. "A macro economy as an ecology of plans", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 82, n°2-3, pp433-444
  • b. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons", Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  • c. "Viennese Kaleidics: Why it’s Liberty more than Policy that Calms Turbulence", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 25, n°4, pp283-297
  • d. "The Social Construction of Theoretical Landscapes: Some Economics of Economic Theories", In: Daniel Sutter, dir., "Different but Equal: Documenting the Contribution of Dissident Scholars", West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, pp43–62
  • e. "The Cameralists: Fertile Sources for a New Science of Public Finance", In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., "Handbook for the History of Economic Thought", Dordrecht: Springer, pp123–135

• 2013,
  • a. avec Marta Podemska-Mikluch, "Dyads, triads, and the theory of exchange: Between liberty and coercion", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 26, n°2, Juin
  • b. avec A. Fink, "Political entrepreneurship and the formation of special districts", European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 35, pp427–439
  • c. avec Shruti Rajagopalan, "Constitutional Craftsmanship and the Rule of Law", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 24, n°4, pp295-309

• 2014, "Game Theory and the Architecture of Social Theory: Reflections on Luigino Bruni’s Ethos of the Market", Studies in Emergent Order, Vol 7, pp225-238

• 2015,
  • a. "The Tax State as Source of Perpetual Crisis", In: Peter Boettke et Christopher Coyne, dir., "The Oxford Handbook in Austrian Economics", Oxford University Press, pp445-463
  • b. avec James Caton, "Volatility in Catallactical Systems: Austrian Cycle Theory Revisited", In: Christopher J. Coyne, Virgil Henry Storr, dir., "New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp95-117
  • c. avec Vipin P. Veetil, "Treating Macro Theory as Systems Theory: How Might it Matter?", In: Christopher J. Coyne, Virgil Henry Storr, dir., "New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp119-143
  • d. "Collaboration vs. Imposition as Motifs for a Theory of Public Finance: Transcending the Goldscheid-Schumpeter Debate", In: Helge Peukert, dir., "Taking up the challenge!”: Festschrift for Jürgen Backhaus", Metropolis

• 2016,
  • a. "Politics as a Peculiar Business. Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy", Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
  • b. avec Rosolino Candela, "Vilfredo Pareto’s Theory of Action: An Alternative to Behavioral Economics”, Il Pensiero Economico Italiano, Vol 24, n°2, pp15–30

• 2017,
  • a. avec Ion Sterpan, "The autonomy of the political within political economy", In: Paul Dragos Aligica, Paul Lewis, Virgil H. Storr, dir., "The Austrian and Bloomington schools of political economy", Advances in Austrian economics, Vol 22, Bingley: Emerald Publishing, pp133-158</ref>
  • b. "Dispute resolution when rationalities conflict: cost and choice in a mixed economy", In: Peter J. Boettke, Todd Zywicki, dir., "Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics", Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp209-232 (en)
  • c. avec Marta Podemska-Mikluch, "Economic Coordination across Divergent Institutional Frameworks: Dissolving a Theoretical Antinomy", Review of Political Economy, January, Vol 29, n°2

• 2018,
  • a. avec Alexander Salter, "Political Entrepreneurship, Emergent Dynamics, and Constitutional Politics", Review of Social Economy, Vol 76, n°3, pp281–301
  • b. "Buchanan’s Liberal Theory of Political Economy: A Valiant but Failed Effort to Square the Circle", In: Peter J. Boettke, Solomon Stein, dir., "Buchanan’s Tensions: Reexamining the Political Economy and Philosophy of James M. Buchanan", Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, pp9–34
  • c. dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", Palgrave Macmillan
  • d. "Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant?", In: Richard E. Wagner, dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", Palgrave Macmillan, pp1-9
  • e. avec Abigail N. Devereaux, "Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy", In: Richard E. Wagner, dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", Palgrave Macmillan, pp109-129
  • f. avec Meg Patrick Tuszynski, "Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity", In: Richard Wagner, dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", Springer, pp291-311

• 2019,
  • a. "Economic Theory and the Social Question: Some Dialectics Regarding the Work-Dependency Relationship", Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol 139, n°2-4, pp407–420
  • b. "Gordon Tullock: A Maverick Scholar of Law and Economics", In: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", New York: Springer, pp990-996
  • c. "Legal Disputes", In: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", New York: Springer, pp1265-1269

De 2020 à 2023

• 2020,
  • a. "Macroeconomics as Systems Theory: Transcending the Micro-Macro Dichotomy", London: Palgrave Macmillan
  • b. avec Marta Podemska-Mikluch, "Pandemic Politics within a System of Entangled Political Economy", Journal of Contextual Economics, Vol 140, pp87–110

• 2023, avec Marta Podemska-Mikluch, Mikayla Novak, "Realism, Ideology, and the Convulsions of Democracy", Springer