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Richard E. Wagner

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Richard E. Wagner
Économiste
Dates
Richard E Wagner.jpg
Tendance École du Choix Public
Nationalité États-Unis États-Unis
Articles internes Autres articles sur Richard E. Wagner
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Interwikis sur Richard E. Wagner

Richard E. Wagner, né le 28 avril 1941, est professeur d'économie à la George Mason University à Fairfax (États-Unis). C'est un penseur de l'école du Choix Public, spécialiste du fédéralisme concurrentiel et du polycentrisme.

Cet auteur, accompagné de James Buchanan, s'est attaché à comprendre pourquoi les gouvernements ne cessaient de croitre en taille. En 1977, ils expliquent que les citoyens sont des ardents quémandeurs de biens publics car ils réalisent qu'ils ne subissent pas le coût complet des services publics grâce au déficit public. Ainsi, il se crée dans l'esprit de la plupart des citoyens une illusion que ces services publics ont un faible coût. Par conséquent, les électeurs sont plus prompts à soutenir les hommes politiques qui encouragent la dépense publique plutôt que ceux qui la maîtrisent. Toujours en 1977, en compagnie de son collègue Warren E. Weber, il présente une étude qui examine empiriquement la croissance des dépenses publiques au XXe siècle pour plusieurs nations. Il en vient aux mêmes conclusions que son homonyme Adolphe Wagner, un siècle plus tôt et qui porte le nom célèbre de loi de Wagner.

En 1980, il reprend une partie des travaux de Bruno S. Frey sur l'incidence néfaste des élections sur le cycle économique. L'échéance électorale ainsi que son anticipation faussent l'évolution naturelle de l'activité économique. Les détenteurs du pouvoir profitent de leur situation politique pour orienter l'économie en favorisant tel ou tel groupe de pression. Le jeu de l'alternance accentue ces cycles avec des retournements de politiques économiques radicales qui fragilisent les structures économiques. Au lieu de laisser l'économie jouer son rôle régulateur naturel, les cycles électoraux perturbent, contredisent ou annihilent toutes les politiques économiques qui auraient, peut être dans un contexte autre, une certaine cohérence.

Publications

De 1966 à 1979

  • 1966, "Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article", commentaire du livre de Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action", Public Choice, Vol 1, Fall, pp161-170
  • 1967, avec James M. Buchanan, Public Debt in a Democratic Society, Washington: American Enterprise Institute
  • 1970, "Optimality in Local Debt Limitation." National Tax Journal 23 (septembre): 297-305
    • Repris en 1972, In: The Theory of Public Choice, ed. par James M. Buchanan et Robert D. Tollison, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 123-35
    • Repris en 1980, In: The Economics of Federalism, ed. by Bhajan S. Grewel, Geoffrey Brennan et Russel L. Mathews, Canberra: Australian National University Press, pp. 351-63
  • 1971,
    • a. Optimality in Local Debt Limitation: Reply, National Tax Journal 24 (mars): 109-111
    • b. The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism, Chicago: Markham
  • 1973,
    • a. The Public Economy. Chicago: Markham
    • b. Death and Taxes: Some Perspectives on Inheritance, Inequality, and Progressive Taxation. Washington: American Enterprise Institute
      • Repris en 1974, In: Perspectives on Tax Reform, Richard E. Wagner, et al, Dir., New York: Praeger, pp1-67
  • 1974,
    • a Politics, Bureaucracy, and Budgetary Choice: A Review of the Brookings Budget for 1974, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, August, pp367-83
    • b. Perspectives on Tax Reform. New York: Praeger
  • 1975,
    • a. avec Warren E. Weber, "Competition, Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas", Journal of Law and Economics 18 (décembre): 661-84
    • b. The Antisocial Activities of the Public Sector, The Banker 125 (décembre): 1503-1511
  • 1976,
    • a. Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, Public Choice 25 (Spring): 45-61
    • b. Institutional Constraints and Local Community Formation, American Economic Review, Proceedings, 66 (mai): 110-15
      • Traduit en italien en 1976, In: Problemi di Amminstrazione Pubblica (No. 4, 1976): 39-52
    • c. avec Gordon Tullock, Rational Models, Politics, and Policy Analysis, Policy Studies Journal 4 (Summer): 408-416
  • 1977, avec James M. Buchanan, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, New York: Academic Press
* Traduction japonaise en 1979
* Traduction coréenne en 1981
* Traduction espagnole en 1983
  • 1977, Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications, Kyklos 30 (No. 3 1977): 395-410
  • 1977, Inheritance and the State: Tax Principles for a Free and Prosperous Commonwealth. Washington: American Enterprise Institute
* Le Ch. 2, "The Egalitarian Imperative," fut repris en 1983 In: Against Equality: Readings on Economic and Social Policy, ed. by William Letwin (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 297-312.]
  • 1977, avec Warren E. Weber, "Wagner's Law, Fiscal Institutions, and the Growth of Government", National Tax Journal 30 (mars 1977): 59-68
  • 1977, "Tax Policy Toward Private Foundations: Confused Principles and Unfortunate Legislation." Policy Studies Journal 5 Spring 1977): 314-19
  • 1977, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice: Reply." Public Choice 29 (Spring 1977): 131-32
  • 1977, Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications, Kyklos, 30, n°3, pp395-410
  • 1978,
    • a. avec Dolores T. Martin, The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California, Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2): 409–425
    • b. avec James M. Buchanan et John Burton, The Consequences of Mr. Keynes, London: Institute for Economic Affairs
- Extraits repris en 1981, In: Solutions to Unemployment, ed. by David C. Collander (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 27-31.]
- Traduction italienne en 1979, In: S. Carrubba et Domenico Da Empoli, dir., "La Scuola di Public Choice", Rome: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, pp217-251
    • c. avec James M. Buchanan, Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
    • d. avec Gordon Tullock, Policy Analysis and Deductive Reasoning, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath
    • e. avec James M. Buchanan, Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion, Journal of Monetary Economics 4 (juillet 1978): 627-36
      • Traduit en espagnol en 1984, In: La Economia del Deficit Publico, J.J. Fernandez Cainzos, dir., Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, pp263-83
    • f. "Carl Menger's Contribution to Economics: Introduction", Atlantic Economic Journal 6 (septembre), pp1-2
    • g. "Carl Menger's Contribution to Economics: Final Remarks", Atlantic Economic Journal 6 (septembre), pp65-69
  • 1979,
    • a. "Comment: Politics, Monetary Control, and Economic Performance," in Time, Uncertainty, and Disequilibrium. pp. 177-86. Edited by Mario Rizzo. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Co
    • b. The Tax Expenditure Budget: An Exercise in Fiscal Impressionism. Washington, DC: Tax Foundation
    • c. Government Aid to Private Schools: Is It a Trojan Horse? Wichita, KS: Center for Independent Education
    • d. avec Paul Craig Roberts, The Tax Reform Fraud, Policy Review (Summer): 121-39
    • e. "Legalized Counterfeiting", Policy reports, Vol 1, n°7, p1, pp3-5, p7

De 1980 à 1989

- édition révisée en 1982
  • 1980, Spending Limitation, the Constitution, and Productivity: A Response to James Tobin, Journal of Contemporary Studies 3 (Winter): 59-67
  • 1980, Sense versus Sensibility in the Taxation of Personal Wealth, Canadian Taxation: A Journal of Tax Policy 2 (Spring): 23-30
  • 1980, Boom and Bust: The Political Economy of Economic Disorder, Journal of Libertarian Studies 4 (Winter):1-37
  • 1983,
    • a. Funded Social Security: Collective and Private Options, Cato Journal 3 (Fall): 581-602
    • b. Public Finance: Revenues and Expenditures in a Democratic Society. Boston: Little, Brown
    • c. On Economics, Political Science, and Public Policy, Policy Studies Journal 12 (décembre): 251-57
  • 1985,
    • a. A Reconsideration of Some Principles of Tax Reform, Florida Policy Review, 1, Spring, pp13-18
    • b. Tax Reform through Constitutional Limitation: A Sympathetic Critique, Cumberland Law Review, 15, n°2, pp475-97
    • c. Normative and Positive Foundations of Tax Reform, Cato Journal 5 (Fall): 385-99
    • d. avec Thomas S. McCaleb, The Experimental Search for Free Riders: Some Reflections and Observations, Public Choice, 47, n°3, pp479-90
  • 1987, "James M. Buchanan: Constitutional Political Economist", Regulation, Vol 11, février, pp13-17
  • 1987, avec Jürgen Backhaus, The Cameralists: A Public Choice Perspective, Public Choice 53 (No. 1): 3-20
  • 1987, Courts, Legislatures, and Constitutional Maintenance, Cato Journal 7 (Fall): 323-29
  • 1988,
    • a. avec Robert D. Tollison, Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking, and Public Policy, Lexington, MA: D.C. Health
    • b. avec James D. Gwartney, The Public Choice Revolution, The Intercollegiate Review, Volume 23, Number 2, Spring, pp17-26
    • c. avec James D. Gwartney, The Federal Budget Process: Why It Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed, Tallahassee, FL: James Madison Institute
    • d. avec James D. Gwartney, Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, Greenwich, CT: JAI press
    • e. The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective, Public Choice, 56, février, pp153-66
      • Repris en 1993, In: Public Choice Theory, Vol. III, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, pp413-26
    • f. Morals, Interests, and Constitutional Order, Oregon Law Review, 67, n°1, pp73-92
    • g. avec Robert D. Tollison, Social Cost, Rent Seeking, and Smoking, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 6, décembre, pp171-86
    • h. avec James D. Gwartney, "Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government", In: James Gwartney et Richard E. Wagner, dir., "Public choice and constitutional economics", Greenwich, Coon.: JAI Press et London: JAI Press, pp3—28
  • 1989,
    • a. To Promote The General Welfare: Market Processes vs. Political Transfers. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute
    • b. Constitutional Order in a Federal Republic, Public Choice, 61, mai, pp187-92
    • c. Politics, Central Banking, and Economic Order, Critical Review, 3, Summer/Fall, pp11-22

de 1990 à 1999

  • 1990,
    • a. avec Charles K. Rowley, Choosing Freedom: Public Choice and the Libertarian Idea, Liberty 3 (janvier): 43-45
    • b. avec Mwangi S. Kimenyi et Robert D. Tollison, Regulatory Finance in Alternative Models of Regulation: General Fund Financing Versus Earmarked Taxes, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 6, n°4, pp519-29
  • 1991,
    • a. avec Robert D. Tollison, The Economics of Smoking, Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff
    • b. Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice. London: Routledge
    • c. avec Robert D. Tollison, Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform, Kyklos, Vol 44, n°1, pp57-70
      • Repris en 1995, In: The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Robert D. Tollison et Roger D. Congleton, Dir., Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
    • d. avec Robert D. Tollison, Self Interest, Public Interest, and Public Health, Public Choice, Vol 69, n°3, pp323-43
    • e. avec Robert D. Tollison, The Logic of Natural Monopoly Regulation, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol 17, n°4, pp483-90
  • 1992,
    • a. avec Karen Vaughn, Public Debt Controversies: An Essay in Reconciliation, Kyklos, Vol 45, n°1, pp57-70
    • b. Grazing the Budgetary Commons: The Rational Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility, Journal of Law and Politics, 9, Fall, pp105-19
    • c. Crafting Social Rules: Common Law vs. Statute Law, Once Again, Constitutional Political Economy, 3, Fall, pp381-97
  • 1993,
    • a. Federal Transfer Taxation: A Study in Social Cost. Washington: Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation
    • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, Who Benefits from WHO? The Decline of the World Health Organization, London: The Social Affairs Unit
    • c. Parchment, Guns, and Constitutional Order. Hants, UK: Edward Elgar
      • Repris en 1993, In: Property Rights and the Limits of Democracy, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    • d. The Impending Transformation of Public Choice Scholarship, Public Choice, 77, pp203-12
    • e. Commentaire du livre de Gerard Radnitzky, dir., Universal Economics: Assessing the Achievements of the Economic Approach, Cato Journal 12, Winter, pp737-739
  • 1994, "Economic Efficiency, Rent Seeking, and Democracy: Zenoistic Variations on Coaseian Themes", In: Peter J. Boettke, Mario J. Rizzo, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics", Vol 1, pp129-144
  • 1995,
    • a. avec Charles K. Rowley et Willem Thorbecke, Trade Protection in the United States, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
      • Traduction coréenne en 1998
    • b. A Competitive Federalism for the New Century, Madison Review, 1, Fall, pp34-40
    • c. Commentaire du livre de Tomas J. Philipson et de Richard A. Posner, Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 33, (septembre, pp1365-1367
    • d. Commentaire du livre de Mark Schneider, Paul Teske et Michael Mintrom, Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 6, Summer, pp203-204
  • 1996,
    • a. Economic Policy in a Liberal Democracy, Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar
      • Repris en 1996, In: The Political Economy of the Minimal State, Charles K. Rowley, Dir., Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    • b. Commentaire du livre de Donald Wittman, The myth of democratic failure, Constitutional Political Economy, 7, 153–160
    • c. Who Owes What, and to Whom? Public Debt, Ricardian Equivalence, and Governmental Form, Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 9, n°2, pp143-57
    • d. Federal Transfer Taxation: The Effect on Saving, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Dissipation, Family Business Review, Vol 9, Fall, pp269-83
    • e. Commentaire du livre de Donald A. Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, n°2, pp153-156
    • f. Commentaire du livre de Nicolai J. Foss, The Austrian School and Modern Economics: Essays in Reassessment, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, n°3, pp239-241
  • 1997,
    • a. Parasitical political pricing, economic calculation, and the size of government: Variations on a theme by Maffeo Pantaleoni, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 15, pp135–146
    • b. Choice, Exchange, and Public Finance, American Economic Review, Proceedings 87 (mai, pp160-63
    • c. avec Robert E. McCormick et Robert D. Tollison, Smoking, Insurance, and Social Cost, Regulation, Vol 20 (Summer, pp33-37
    • d. avec Mark Crain, Politics, Public Capital, and the Structure of Production, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 15, pp3-24
    • e. Parasitical Political Pricing, Economic Calculation, and the Size of Government: Variations on a Theme by Maffeo Pantaleoni, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol 15, n°2-3, pp135-46
  • 1998,
    • a. “Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing.” Constitutional Political Economy 9 (No. 2): 105-11.

De 2000 à 2009

  • 2000,
  • 2001, Competition as a Rivalrous Process: Attilio da Empoli and the Years of High Theory that Might Have Been.” Journal of Economic Studies 28 (No. 4/5): 337-45
  • 2001, avec Donald P. Racheter, Federalist Government in Principle and Practice, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
  • 2002, Complexity, Governance, and Constitutional Craftsmanship.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 61 (janvier 2002): 105-22
- Repris en 2002, The New Political Economics, ed. par Laurence S. Moss (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
  • 2002, Custom, Legislation, and Market Order.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 61 (avril 2002): 563-69
  • 2002, Some Institutional Problematics of Excess Burden Analytics,” Public Finance Review 30 (novembre 2002): 531-45
  • 2002, avec Donald P. Racheter, Politics, Taxation, and the Rule of Law: The Power to Tax in Constitutional Perspective, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
  • 2003,
    • a. avec Ryan D. Oprea, Institutions, Emergence, and Macro Theorizing: A Review Essay on Roger Garrison’s Time and Money, Review of Austrian Economics 16 (No. 1, 2003): 97-109
    • b. Happy Anniversary? Ninety Years of the Income Tax, The World and I (avril): 28-33
    • c. Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance, Il Pensiero Economico 11,(No. 1): 271-82
  • 2004,
    • a. avec Jürgen G. Backhaus, Handbook of Public Finance, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
    • b. “Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise: Charlottesville, Blacksburg, and Fairfax Retrospectively Viewed.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63 (janvier 2004): 55-74.
    • c. “Inefficient Market Pricing: An Illusory Economic Box” (avec Kevin Brancato). Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 22 (2004): 3-13.
    • d. Public choice as an academic enterprise: Charlottesville, Blacksburg, and Fairfax retrospectively viewed, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Jan
  • 2005,
    • a. The World Health Organization: A Time for Re-Constitution. London: International Policy Network
    • b. State Excise Taxation: Horse-and-Buggy Taxes in an Electronic Age. Washington: Tax Foundation
    • c. Verizon and MCI: A Merger that Promotes Competition. Mt. Pleasant, IA: Public Interest Institute
    • d. “Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom’s Scholarly Œuvre”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 57, n°2, pp173-188
    • e. "Austrian Cycle Theory and the Prospect of a Coordinationist Macroeconomics", In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., Modern Applications of Austrian Thought, Routledge, pp60-121
  • 2007, Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance: An Exploratory Essay. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  • 2009,
    • a. "Elections as takeover bids: Some agonistics concerning good government", The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 22, n°2, June, pp145-150
    • b. avec Adam Martin, "Heterogeneity, Voting, and Public Policy", Public Finance and Management, Vol 9, pp393-415
    • c. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance: An Exploratory Essay", Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar

Depuis 2010

  • 2010,
    • a. "Change within permanence: time and the bivalent logic of economic analysis", In: Roger Koppl, Steven Horwitz, Pierre Desrochers, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics" - Volume 14 - "What is so Austrian about Austrian Economics?", ISBN: 978-0-85724-261-7, pp181-203
    • b. "Mind, Society, and Human Action: Time and Knowledge in a Theory of Social Economy", London, New York: Routledge
  • 2012,
    • a. "A macro economy as an ecology of plans", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 82, n°2-3, pp433-444
    • b. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons", Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    • c. "Viennese Kaleidics: Why it’s Liberty more than Policy that Calms Turbulence", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 25, pp283-297
    • d. "The Social Construction of Theoretical Landscapes: Some Economics of Economic Theories", In: Daniel Sutter, dir., "Different but Equal: Documenting the Contribution of Dissident Scholars", West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, pp43–62
    • e. "The Cameralists: Fertile Sources for a New Science of Public Finance", In: Jürgen G. Backhaus, dir., "Handbook for the History of Economic Thought", Dordrecht: Springer, pp123–135
  • 2015,
    • a. "The Tax State as Source of Perpetual Crisis", In: Peter Boettke et Christopher Coyne, dir., "The Oxford Handbook in Austrian Economics", Oxford University Press, pp445-463
    • b. avec James Caton, "Volatility in Catallactical Systems: Austrian Cycle Theory Revisited", In: Christopher J. Coyne, Virgil Henry Storr, dir., "New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp95-117
    • c. avec Vipin P. Veetil, "Treating Macro Theory as Systems Theory: How Might it Matter?", In: Christopher J. Coyne, Virgil Henry Storr, dir., "New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp119-143
    • d. "Collaboration vs. Imposition as Motifs for a Theory of Public Finance: Transcending the Goldscheid-Schumpeter Debate", In: Helge Peukert, dir., "Taking up the challenge!”: Festschrift for Jürgen Backhaus", Metropolis
  • 2016,
    • a. "Politics as a Peculiar Business. Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy", Cheltenham
    • b. avec Rosolino Candela, "Vilfredo Pareto’s Theory of Action: An Alternative to Behavioral Economics”, Il Pensiero Economico Italiano, Vol 24, n°2, pp15–30
  • 2019,
    • a. dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", New York: Palgrave Macmillan
    • b. "Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant?", In: Richard Wagner, dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp1-9
    • c. avec Abigail N. Devereaux, "Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy", In: Richard Wagner, dir., "James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy", New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp109-129

Littérature secondaire

  • 2005, Roberta Herzberg, Commentary on Richard Wagner's "Self-governance, polycentrism, and federalism: Recurring themes in Vincent Ostrom's scholarly oeuvre", ournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 57, n°2, pp189-197

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