William Shughart (bibliographie)

Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de William Shughart, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

De 1983 à 1989

• 1983, avec Robert D. Tollison, Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 291-304, June

• 1984,
  • a. avec W. Mark Crain, Robert D. Tollison, "The convergence of satisficing to marginalism: An empirical test", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol 5, n°3-4, pp375-385
  • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, "The Random Character of Merger Activity", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol 15, Winter, pp500–509
  • c. avec Robert D. Tollison, "The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity", Public Choice, Vol 45, pp303-311
  • d. avec Phyllis Altrogge, "The Regressive Nature of Civil Penalties", International Review of Law and Economics, Vol 4, June, pp55-66

• 1985,
  • a. avec Robert D. Tollison, The Positive Economics of Antitrust Policy: A Survey Article, International Review of Law and Economics, 5, pp39-57
  • b. avec Gary M. Anderson et Robert D. Tollison, “Adam Smith on the Customhouse”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 93, n°4, August
  • c. avec Ryan Amacher, Richard S. Higgins, Robert D. Tollison, "The Behavior of Regulatory Activity Over the Business Cycle: An Empirical Test", Economic Inquiry, Vol 23, January, pp7-19
  • d. avec Mwangi Kimenyi, Robert D. Tollison, "What Do Judges Maximize?", Economia Delle Scelte Pubbliche, pp181-188 (Les auteurs suggèrent que les juges sont motivés par des facteurs pécuniaires).
  • e. avec Richard S. Higgins, Robert D. Tollison, "Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking", Public Choice, Vol 46, pp247-258

• 1986, avec Robert D. Tollison, Brian L. Goff, "Bureaucratic Structure and Congressional Control", Southern Economic Journal, Vol 52, April, pp962-972

• 1987,
  • a. "Don't Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!", Cato Journal, Vol 6, Winter, pp925-932
  • b. avec Richard S. Higgins, Robert D. Tollison, "Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws", In: Robert J. Mackay, James C. Miller III, Bruce Yandle, dir., "Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission", Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press

• 1988,
  • a. avec Mwangi Kimenyi, Robert D. Tollison, "Affirmative action and unemployment", European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol 4; n°4, pp479-490
  • b. A Public Choice Perspective of the Banking Act of 1933", Cato Journal 7 (Winter), pp. 595−613
    • Repris en 1988, In: Catherine England et Thomas Huertas, Dir., The Financial Services Revolution: Policy Directions for the Future. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp87−105
  • c. avec Brian L. Goff et Robert D. Tollison, Disqualification by Decree: Amateur Rules as Barriers to Entry, Journal of institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144, n°3, pp515—23
  • d. avec W. Mark Crain, Robert D. Tollison, "Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable Assets", Southern Economic Journal, Vol 55, October, pp303-314

• 1989,
  • a. avec Donald J. Boudreaux, “The Effects of Monetary Instability on the Extent of Vertical Integration”, Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol 17, n° 3, June, pp1-10
  • b. "Antitrust Policy in the Reagan Administration: Pyrrhic Victories?", In: Roger Meiners, Bruce Yandle, dir., "Regulation and the Reagan Years: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Public Interest", New York: Holmes and Meier for The Independent Institute, pp89-103
  • c. avec Gary M. Anderson, Robert D. Tollison, "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 32, April, pp215-228
  • d. avec Mwangi Kimenyi, "Political Successions and the Growth of Government", Public Choice, Vol 62, pp173-179

De 1990 à 1999

• 1990,
  • a. The Organization of Industry. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin
    • 2ème édition en 1997, Houston, Tex.: Dame Publications
  • b. Antitrust Policy and Interest-Group Politics, New York: Quorum Books
  • c. Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation, Deterrence, or Extortion?, Regulation, Fall, pp53−61

• 1991, avec Robert D. Tollison, The Employment Consequences of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 147, pp38–52

• 1992, avec William F. Chappell, Market Structure, Sales to Government, and the Theory of Oligopoly, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 19, pp69-81

• 1993,
  • a. avec James F. Couch, A. L. Williams, "Private School Enrollment and Public School Performance", Public Choice, Vol 76, pp301-312
  • b. avec B. J. Das, W. F. Chappell, "Demand fluctuations and firm heterogeneity", Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol 41, pp51–60

• 1994, avec Fred S. McChesney, dir., The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, University of Chicago Press

• 1995, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, In: Fred S. McChesney et William F. Shughart II, Dir., The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust. The Public-Choice Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, s. 7–32

• 1996, Monopoly and the Problem of the Economists, Managerial and Decision Economics 17, 217–230

• 1997, Dir., Taxing Choice: The Predatory Politics of Fiscal Discrimination. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers

• 1998,
  • a. avec Richard B. McKenzie, Is Microsoft a Monopolist?, Independent Review, 3, Fall, pp165−197
  • b. The Government's War on Mergers: The Fatal Conceit of Antitrust Policy, Cato Policy Analysis, n°323, October 22
  • c. avec Jim Couch, "The Political Economy of the New Deal", Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar

De 2000 à 2009

• 2000,
  • a. Barbarians at Bill Gates, The Freeman, 50, April, pp23−29
  • b. avec Richard B. McKenzie, Why the Case for a Breakup Breaks Down, The Wall Street Journal, 25 April, pA26
  • c. Barbarians at Bill Gates. Antitrust Is about Interest-Group Politics, Not Consumer Protection, The Freeman, April, Vol 50, n°4

• 2001, avec M. Young et M. Reksulak, The Political Economy of the IRS, Economics and Politics 13, pp201-220

• 2002, avec Robert D. Tollison, "A Creative Theorist in His Workshop: James M. Buchanan as a Positive Economist", In: Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, Robert D. Tollison, dir. "Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan", Springer, pp66-77

• 2004,
  • a. avec Fred S. McChesney II, David Haddock, “On the Internal Contradictions of the Law of One Price”, Economic Inquiry, Vol 42, n°4, October, pp706–716
  • b. "Bending before the Storm: The U.S. Supreme Court in Economic Crisis, 1935–1937", The Independent Review, vol 9, n°1, summer, pp55–83

• 2005, avec Robert D. Tollison, "The Unfinished Business of Public Choice", Public Choice, 124, pp237–247

• 2006, Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief, Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 31-53, April

• 2007, avec Michael J. Hicks, "Quit Playing Favorites: Why Business Subsidies Hurt Our Economy", In: Russell S. Sobel, dir., "Unleashing Capitalism: Why Prosperity Stops at the West Virginia Border and How to Fix It", Morgantown, WV: Center for Economic Growth, The Public Policy Foundation of West Virginia, pp119-130

De 2010 à 2019

• 2010, "Cost Inflation in Intercollegiate Athletics: And Some Modest Proposals for Controlling It", In: Joshua C. Hall, dir., "Doing More With Less: Making Colleges Work Better", New York: Springer, pp71–94

• 2011, "Disaster Relief as Bad Public Policy", The Independent Review, 15(4), pp519-539

• 2013, avec L. Razzolini, M. Reksulak, dir., "Elgar Companion to Public Choice", Edward Elgar Publishers, Ltd.

• 2014, avec Adam J. Hoffer, Michael D. Thomas, "Sin Taxes and Sindustry: Revenue, Paternalism, and Political Interest", The Independent Review, Vol XIX, n°1, pp47–64

• 2015,
  • a. avec Diana Thomas, "What Did Economists Do? Euvoluntary, voluntary, and Coercive Institutions for Collective Action", Southern Economic Journal, 80(4), pp926-937
  • b. avec Diana Thomas, "Intellectual Property Rights, Public Choice, Networks, and the New Age of Informal IP Regimes", Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 23, n°1

• 2016, avec Jayme S. Lemke, "Richard Vedder and the Future of Higher Education Reform", Cato Journal, 36(1), pp143-164

• 2017, avec Adam Hoffer, Rejeana Gvillo, Michael Thomas, "Income-expenditure elasticities of less-healthy consumption goods", Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Vol 6, n°1, pp127-148

• 2019, avec Diana Thomas, "Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture", In: Roger Congleton, Bernard Grofman, Stefan Voigt, dir., "The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice", Vol 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp585–603

De 2020 à 2023

• 2020, avec Diana Thomas, Michael D. Thomas, "Institutional Change and the Importance of Understanding Shared Mental Models", Kyklos, Vol 73, August, n°3, pp371–391

• 2022, "On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice", Public Choice, vol 191, pp1–19