Daniel Klein (bibliographie)

Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de Daniel Klein, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

De 1981 à 1989

• 1981, "Roots of Austrianism", commentaire du livre de Carl Menger, "Principles of Economics", Libertarian Review, September, pp37-39

• 1983, "F. A. Hayek, lectures in retrospect on J. M. Keynes", Market process, Vol 1, n°2

• 1984, "What the Government Takes", The Freeman, Décembre, Vol 34, n°12, pp725-726

• 1985, “Deductive economic methodology in the French Enlightenment: Condillac and Destutt de Tracy”, History of Political Economy, 17:1, pp51-71

• 1987, "Tie-ins and the Market Provision of Collective Goods", Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring, pp451-474

• 1988,
  • a. avec John Majewski, "Private Profit, Public Good, and Engineering Failure: The Plank Roads of New York", Working Paper 88/3, Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
  • b. avec John Majewski, "Privatization, Regulation, and Public Repossession: The Turnpike Companies of Early America", Photocopy, University of California, Irvine

De 1990 à 1999

• 1990, The Voluntary provision of public goods? The Turnpike Companies of early America, Economic Inquiry, 28(4), pp788-812, octobre
  • Repris en 2002, In: David Beito, Peter Gordon et Alexander Tabarrok, dir., The Voluntary City, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

• 1992,
  • a. Go Ahead and Let Him Try: A Plea for Egonomic Laissez-Faire, Vol 35, Journal of Philosophy, pp3-20
  • b. avec Gordon J. Fielding, "Private Toll Roads: Learning from the Nineteenth Century", Transportation Quarterly, juillet, Vol 46, n°3, pp321-341
  • c. avec John Majewski, "Economy, Community and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797-1845", Law & Society Review, Vol 26, n°3, pp469-512
  • d. "Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing", Economics and Politics, 4, pp117–136
  • e. avec Jason Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, Cato Journal, 12, pp393–412

• 1993,
  • a. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, "Economy, Community and the Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797–1845", Journal of Economic History, mars, pp106-122
  • b. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, "Responding to Relative Decline: The Plank Road Boom of Antebellum New York", Journal of Economic History, Vol 53, n°1, pp106-122
  • c. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, "From Trunk to Branch: Toll Roads in New York, 1800–1860", In: Essays in Economic and Business History Conference Proceedings for the Economic and Business Historical Society, pp191-209
  • d. avec Gordon J. Fielding, "How to Franchise Highways", Journal of Transportation Economics and Policy, Vol XXVII, n°2, mai, pp113-130
  • e. avec Gordon J. Fielding, "High Occupancy/Toll Lanes: Phasing in Congestion Pricing a Lane at a Time", Policy Study, n°170, novembre

• 1994,
  • a. If Government Is So Villainous, How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains?, Economics and Philosophy 10: 91–106
    • Version révisée en 1998, In: Libertarian Essays, Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Éducation
    • Version révisée avec un nouveau postcript en 2005, "If Government is so Villainous, How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains?", In: Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard , dir., "The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp223-244
  • b. The Moral Consequences of Paternalism, The Freeman, Mai, Vol 44, n°5
  • c. Private Highways in America, 1792-1916, The Freeman, Février, Vol 44, n°2
    • Repris en 1996, Private Highways in America, 1792-1916, In: Wilson J. Mixon Jr, dir, Private means, Public Ends: Voluntarism vs Coercicion, Foundation For Economic Education, Irvington on Hudson: NY, pp128-133
  • d. avec John Majewski, "Plank Road Fever in Antebellum America: New York State Origins", New York History, pp39-65
  • e. "Libertarianism as Communitarianism", The Freeman, Vol 44, Décembre

• 1995,
  • a. commentaire du livre dirigé par Donald N. McCloskey, "Second Thoughts: Myths and Morals of U.S. Economic History", The Freeman, January, Vol 45, n°1, pp56-57
  • b. "A Sales Pitch for Laissez-Faire Health Care. What Would Free-Market Health Care Look Like?", The Freeman, July, Vol 45, n°7, pp422-425 [lire en ligne] (L'auteur évoque les avantages de l'établissement de la liberté de propriété, de consentement et de contrat dans les soins médicaux.)
  • c. commentaire du livre de Charles Sprading, "Liberty and the great libertarians : an anthology on liberty, a hand-book of freedom", The Freeman, December, Vol 45, n°12, pp796-797 [lire en ligne]

• 1996, avec Chi Yin, "Use, Esteem, and Profit in Voluntary Provision: Toll Roads in California, 1850-1902", Economic Inquiry, pp678-692

• 1997,
  • a. Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations, Constitutional Political Economy, 8:319-335
  • b. Liberty, Dignity, and Responsibility: The Moral Triad of a Good Society, The Independent Review, Vol 1, n°3, Winter, pp325-352
    • Repris en 1998, In: 3 Libertarian Essays. FEE Occasional Paper, n°1, Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Éducation: pp25-59
  • c. Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
  • d. "Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, by Voluntary Means", In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
  • e. avec Jeremy Shearmur, Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation, In: Daniel B. Klein,, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp29-45
  • f. Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and Safety, In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp97-133
  • g. avec Adrian T. Moore et Binyam Reja, Curb Rights: Eliciting Competition and Entrepreneurship in Urban Transit, The Independent Review, Vol 2, n°1, Summer
    • Repris en 2002, "Improving Bankruptcy Procedure", In: Alexander Tabarrok, dir., "Entrepreneurial economics: bright ideas from the dismal science", Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, pp275-298
  • h. Planning, Urban Transit, and the Two Coordinations, Department of Economics, Santa Clara University, Calif. Manuscript
  • i. avec Adrian T. Moore et Binyam Reja, "Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban Transit", Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
  • j. commentaire du livre d'Andrew Gamble, "Hayek : The Iron Cage of Liberty", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 8, pp255-264
  • k. "A Sentinel for Auto Emissions", The Freeman, January, Vol 47, n°1, pp36-37
  • l. avec Adrian T. Moore, Bunyam Reja, "Transit's Transition from Socialism", The Freeman, octobre, Vol 47, n°10

• 1998,
  • a. Planning and the Two Coordinations, avec Illustrations in Urban Transit, Planning and Markets, Volume 1, Number 1
  • b. Quality-and-Safety Assurance: How Voluntary Social Processes Remedy Their Own Shortcomings, The Independent Review, Spring, Vol 2, n°4, pp549-50
  • c. "3 Libertarian Essays", Irvington on Hudson, Foundation for Economic Education

• 1999,
  • a. What Do Economists Contribute ?, New York: New York University Press
  • b. Discovery and the Deepself, The Review of Austrian Economics, 11
  • c. "The Ways of John Gray: A Libertarian Commentary", The Independent Review, Vol 4, n°1, Summer, pp63–89
  • d. "Assurance and Trust in a Great Society", FEE Occasional Paper n°2, Irvington, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education
  • e. avec Jeremy Shearmur, "Good Conduct in a Great Society: Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation", In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., "Assurance and Trust in a Great Society", FEE Occasional Paper n°2, Irvington, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education

De 2000 à 2004

• 2000,
  • a. "What Do Academic Economists Contribute?", Policy, Winter, Vol 16, n°2
  • b. "Assurance and Trust in a Great Society", Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education

• 2001,
  • a. Plea to Economists Who Favor Liberty: Assist the Everyman, Eastern Economic Journal, vol. 27, n°2, pp185-202
  • b. "Credit-Information Reporting. Why Free Speech Is Vital to Social Accountability and Consumer Opportunity", The Independent Review, Vol 3, n°1, winter, p325
  • c. Commentaire du livre de Henry I. Miller, "To America's Health: A Proposal to Reform the Food and Drug Administration", The Freeman, Juillet, Vol 51, n°7

• 2002,
  • a. avec Fred E. Foldvary, The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, Knowledge, Technology, & Policy, Vol 15, n°3, Fall, pp82-92
  • b. "Asymmetric Interpretations", Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 12, n°1, mars
  • c. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America", In: Peter Gordon, David Beito, Alexander Tabarrok, dir., "The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society", University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp76-101

• 2003,
  • a. avec Henry Demmert, "Experiment on Entrepreneurial Discovery: An Attempt to Demonstrate the Conjecture of Hayek and Kirzner", Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Vol 50, n°3, pp295–310
  • b. Fencing the Airshed: Using Remote Sensing to Police Auto Emissions, In: Fred E. Foldvary et Daniel B. Klein, Dir., The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, New York: New York University Press, pp86-106
  • c. avec Fred E. Foldvary, The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, New York: New York University Press

• 2004,
  • a. avec Therese DiCola, Institutional Ties of Journal of Development Economics Authors and Editors, Econ Journal Watch 1(2): 319-330
  • b. Mere Libertarianism: Blending Hayek and Rothbard, Reason Papers 27: 7-42
  • c. The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (As Much As They Do), The Independent Review
  • d. avec Alexander Tabarrok, Quotations: Economists’ Judgments about the FDA
  • e. avec Eric Chiang, "The Social Science Citation Index: A Black Box – with an Ideological Bias?", Econ Journal Watch, 1(1), pp134-165
  • f. avec Eric Chiang, "Citation Counts and SSCI in Personnel Decisions: A Survey of Economics Departments", Econ Journal Watch, 1(1), pp166–174

De 2005 à 2009

• 2005,
  • a. "Information-Knowledge Symposium: Introduction", Econ Journal Watch, Volume 2, Number 1, avril, Symposium on Information and Knowledge in Economics, pp47-55
  • b. "The Ph.D. Circle in Academic Economics", Econ Journal Watch 2(1), avril: 133-48
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, "Professors and Their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists", Critical Review 17(3-4): 257-303
  • d. avec Charlotta Stern, "Political Diversity in Six Disciplines", Academic Questions 18(1), Winter: 40-52
  • e. avec Chris Cardiff, "Faculty Partisan Affiliations in All Disciplines: A Voter-Registration Study", Critical Review, Vol 17, n°3-4, pp237-255
    • Repris en 2013, In: Jeffrey Friedman, Shterna Friedman, dir., "Political Knowledge", 4 vols, Routledge
  • f. avec Andrew Western, "Voter Registration of Berkeley and Stanford Faculty", Academic Questions 18(1): 53–65
  • g. "The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (as Much as They Do)", The Independent Review, Vol 10, n°1, Summer, pp5–37

• 2006,
  • a. avec Charlotta Stern, Sociology and Classical Liberalism, The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, 11(1), Summer, pp37-52
  • b. Sense and Sensibilities: Myrdal’s Plea for Self-Disclosure and Some Disclosures about AEA Members, Econ Journal Watch 3(1): 180–205
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, "Economists’ Policy Views and Voting", Public Choice, 126 (mars, pp331-342
  • d. Free Parking versus Free Markets, The Independent Review, Vol 11, n°2, Fall, pp289-297
  • e. avec John Majewski, "America’s Toll Road Heritage: The Achievements of Private Initiative in the Nineteenth Century", In: Gabriel Roth, dir., "Street Smart: Competition, Entrepreneurship and the Future of Roads", New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, pp277-303
  • f. avec Charlotta Stern, "Political Scientists’ Policy Views and Voting", The Political Science Reviewer, Vol 35, pp416-425

• 2007,
  • a. avec Charlotta Stern, "Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economics Association Members", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(2), avril: 309-334
  • b. The Smith-Hayek Economist: From Character to Identity, The Library of Economics and Liberty, Liberty Fund, mars 5
  • c. avec Dan J. D’Amico, The Internet and the Structure of Discourse: The Websites of Economists at Harvard and George Mason, Econ Journal Watch, Vol 4, n°2, Mai, pp272-283
  • d. avec Stewart Dompe, "Reasons for Supporting the Minimum Wage: Asking Signatories of the ‘Raise the Minimum Wage’ Statement", Econ Journal Watch, 4 (1), pp125-167

• 2008,
  • a. Toward a Public and Professional Identity for Our Economics, Econ Journal Watch, 5(3), pp358–372
  • b. avec John Majewski, "Turnpikes and Toll Roads in Nineteenth-Century America", In: Robert Whaples, dir., EH.Net Encyclopedia, 10 février 2008
  • c. "Assurance and trust", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp21-22
  • d. avec Harika Anna Barlett, “Left Out: A Critique of Paul Krugman Based on a Comprehensive Account of His New York Times Columns, 1997 through 2006”, Econ Journal Watch, Vol 5, n°1
  • e. avec Alexander Tabarrok, "Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians' Argumentation for Initial Efficacy Requirements", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 67, n°5, pp743-775

• 2009,
  • a. avec Jason Briggerman, "Israel Kirzner on Coordination and Discovery", The Journal of Private Enterprise, 25 (1), pp1-53
  • b. avec Aaron Orsborn, “Concatenate coordination and mutual coordination”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, pp176–187
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, Groupthink in Academia: Majoritarian Departmental Politics and the Professional Pyramid, The Independent Review, Vol 13, n°4, Spring, pp585–600
  • d. avec Jason Briggeman, "Conservative Magazines and the Presumption of Liberty: A Content Analysis on Sex, Gambling, and Drugs", The Independent Review, Vol 14, n°2, Fall, pp289–299

De 2010 à 2019

• 2010, "Knowledge Flat-talk: A Conceit of Supposed Experts and a Seduction to All", The Independent Review, 15(1), pp109-121

• 2011,
  • a. avec Michael J. Clark, The Music of Social Intercourse: Synchrony in Adam Smith, The Independent Rewiew, winter
  • b. "Competition as a Discovery Procedure: A Rejoinder to Professor Kirzner on Coordination and Discovery", The Journal of Private Enterprise, 27(1), pp121–144

• 2012, "Knowledge and Coordination: A Liberal Interpretation", New York: Oxford University Press

• 2013, avec W. L. Davis, D. Hedengren, "Economics professors’ voting, policy views, favorite economists, and frequent lack of consensus", Econ J Watch, Vol 10, n°1, pp116–125

• 2014, "Ought as an Is: On the Positive-Normative Distinction", Studies in Emergent Order, Vol 7, pp56-73

• 2015, avec Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan, Daniel Houser, Gonzalo Schwarz, "A demand for encompassment: A Hayekian experimental parable about political psychology", Rationality and Society, Vol 27, n°1, février, pp70–95

De 2020 à 2029

• 2020, "Adam Smith’s Rebuke of the Slave Trade, 1759", Independent Review, Vol 25, n°1, pp91–98

• 2021, avec Jonathon Diesel, "A call to embrace jural dualism", Economic Affairs, Vol 41, n°3, pp442-457