Bruce L. Benson

Bruce L. Benson
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Dates	né en 1949
Tendance
Nationalité	États-Unis
Articles internes	Autres articles sur Bruce L. Benson
Citation
Interwikis sur Bruce L. Benson

Bruce L. Benson est un universitaire américain, né le 18 mars 1949, spécialiste de la concurrence des règles de Droit et de l'analyse économique du crime. Libéral et scientifique, il fait partie du bureau éditorial du Journal of Libertarian Studies.

Bruce Benson a examiné très amplement le Droit Marchand médiéval (Merchant Law) et particulièrement la façon dont le corps de lois régissait les transactions commerciales des commerçants dans un contexte international. La "Lex Mercatoria" s'est développée spontanément pour fournir la sécurité de l'expansion du commerce. Bruce Benson montre que le développement du commerce international et l'expansion de la division du travail n'a pas besoin d'institutions gouvernementales, mais ceux-ci se sont plutôt développés sur la base de la création d'une règle endogène par les parties commerciales car elles recherchaient à minimiser les conflits et à réaliser des gains à l'échange.

Dans son domaine d'étude, Bruce Benson n'est pas le seul à soutenir le même argument. De la même façon des auteurs comme Avner Greif ou Janet Landa dans leurs études des réseaux commerciaux en arrivent à la même conclusion.

Cependant, Bruce Benson insiste plus sur l'intérêt personnel qui entraîne le développement d'un corps du Droit non-Etatique dont les parties conviennent d'appliquer de sorte qu'elles puissent réaliser les gains de l'échange, même parmi les individus qui sont socialement et géographiquement éloignés. Avner Greif, pour sa part, montre uniquement comment les mécanismes de réputation peuvent servir à assurer la coopération entre des opérateurs qui sont socialement proches. Tous ces auteurs sont d'accord pour dire que l'ordre social n'est pas nécessairement un produit des institutions gouvernementales, mais plutôt que la paix et la prospérité peuvent émerger en dehors de la structure d'application de l'Etat. Lisa Bernstein (1992) a étudié les règles extra-légales qui régissent le commerce dans l'industrie du diamant, et Robert Ellickson (1991), a examiné la résolution des conflits entre éleveurs et agriculteurs du comté de Shasta, en Californie . Tous ces chercheurs en sciences sociales reconnaissent que la coopération peut progresser entre commerçants sans l'existence d'un ordre directif (de commande) pré-existant à l'échange et que ce phénomène peut se produire dans une variété de contextes sociaux très hétérogènes.

Bibliographie

De 1981 à 1989

• 1981,
  • a. Corruption of Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights, 5, Journal of Libertarian Studies, pp305-311
  • b. Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by “High Demand” Legislators?, 48 Southern Economic Journal, juillet, pp68-77
  • c. "Land-Use Regulation: A Supply and Demand Analysis of Changing Property Rights", Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 5, n°4, Fall, pp435–451

• 1983,
  • a. High Demand Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output, Public Finance Quarterly, Vol 11, pp259-281
  • b. The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol 28, Winter, pp839-862

• 1984,
  • a. Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective, Southern Economic Journal, 51, octobre, pp388–400
  • b. Rent Seeking as a Justification for Privatization, Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol 7, pp5-12
  • c. An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials, Cato Journal, Vol 8, pp139-163
  • d. avec Merle D. Faminow, Rent Seeking and Supply Management in Canada, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 32, pp548-558

• 1985, avec John Baden, The political economy of governmental corruption: The logic of underground government, 14, Journal of Legal Studies, pp391-410

• 1986,
  • a. avec Ronald N. Johnson, The Lagged Impact of State and Local Taxeson Economic Activity and Political Behavior.” Economic Inquiry, 24 (juillet 1986):389-401
  • b. Comment: The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Spring): pp299-427
  • c. avec Merle D. Faminow, Regulatory Transfers in Canadian-American Agriculture: The Case of Supply Management, Cato Journal, Vol 6, n°1, pp271-294
  • d. avec Melvin L. Greenhut, Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox, In: Ronald E. Grieson, dir., Antitrust and Regulation, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, pp53-90
  • e. avec Ronald N. Johnson, Capital Formation and Interstate Tax Competition, In: Dwight Lee, Dir., Taxation and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Press, pp407-436
  • f. Guns for Protection, and other Private Sector Responses to the Government’s Failure to Control Crime, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 8, n°1
  • g. avec Merle D. Faminow, The Incentives to Organize and Demand Regulation: Two Ends Against the Middle, Economic Inquiry

• 1987,
  • a. avec Ronald N. Johnson, Capital Formation and interstate Tax Competition, In: Dwight R. Lee, Dir., Taxation and the Deficit Economy, San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute
  • b. avec M. L. Greenhut et Randall Holcombe, Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox, Cato Journal 6, n°3, Winter, pp801-817

• 1988,
  • a. Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 144, N°5, décembre, pp772-788
    • Repris en 2006, In: Edward P. Stringham, Dir., Anarchy and the Law. The Political Economy of Choice, Ch 38, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar
  • b. Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ Arising with Public Allocation Processes, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol 8, june, pp73–84
  • c. avec Jean Mitchell, Rent Seekers Who Demand Government Production: Bureaucratic Output and the Price of Complements, 56 Public Choice, pp3-16

• 1989,
  • a. Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law without Government, Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol 9, n°1, Winter, pp1-26
  • b. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, Southern Economic Journal, 55, Jan, pp644-661
    • Repris en 1997, In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp165–189
    • Repris en 1999, In: Peter Boettke, Dir., The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek, Vol. 1: Politics, Chelteham: Elgar Reference Collection, pp433-450
  • c. Further Thoughts on Rent Seeking, Bureaucratic Output, and the Price of Complements, Public Choice, Vol 63, pp279-281

De 1990 à 1999

• 1990,
  • a. Customary Law with Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 9: 25–45
  • b. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy
    • Nouvelle édition en 1991
    • Traduction en espagnol en 2000, Justicia sin Estado, Unión Editorial, Madrid

• 1991,
  • a. Reciprocal Exchange as the Basis for Recognition of Law: Examples from American History. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 10: 54–82
  • b. An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising Under Customary American Indian Law, 5,Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 5, pp65-89
  • c. avec David W. Rasmussen, The Relationship Between Illicit Drug Enforcement Policy and Property Crimes, Contemporary Policy Issues, Vol 9, Octobre, pp106–115

• 1992,
  • a. The Development of Criminal Law and its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers, Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 3, pp79-108
  • b. Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp1-27
  • c. avec Kim Iljoong, David W. Rasmussen et Thomas W. Zuehlke, Is Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or Drug Enforcement Policy?, Applied Economics, 24, July, pp679–692
  • d. Illinois’ War on Drugs: Some Unintended Consequences, Heartland Policy Study, 48, April, pp1–36

• 1993,
  • a. The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-Interest’, 6, Review of Austrian Economics, pp43-80
  • b. avec David W. Rasmussen et David L. Sollars, Spatial Competition in Illicit Drug Markets: The Consequences of Increased Drug Enforcement, Review of Regional Studies, Vol 23, Winter, pp219–236
  • c. "Highway Robbery. Police have incentives to commit legalized highway robbery", The Freeman, Juillet

• 1994,
  • a. Legal Philosophy’, In: Peter Boettke, Dir., The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics, London, Edward Elgar, 270-275
  • b. Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights, 5, Constitutional Political Economy, pp129-158
  • c. "Are Public Goods Really Common Pools?, Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England", Economic Inquiry, Vol 32, n°2, avril, pp249-271
    • Repris en 2006, In: Edward P. Stringham, Dir., Anarchy and the Law. The Political Economy of Choice, Ch 34, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar
  • d. avec David W. Rasmussen, The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons, Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
  • e. Third Thoughts on Contracting Out, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 11, Fall, pp44-78
  • f. avec Iljoong Kim et David W. Rasmussen, Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Perspective on the Economics of Crime Literature’, Southern Economic Journal, Vol 61, pp161-168
  • g. avec David W. Rasmussen et Brent L. Mast, Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, Florida State University Working Paper

• 1995,
  • a. Understanding Bureaucratic Behavior: Implications from the Public Choice Literature, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 8: 89–117
  • b. Toxic Torts by Government, in Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute
  • c. avec David W. Rasmussen et David L. Sollars, Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 Public Choice, avril, pp21-45
  • d. The Evolution of Values and Institutions in a Free Society: Underpinnings of a Market Economy, In Gerard Radnitzky et H. Bouillon, dir., volume 1, Values and the Social Order, Aldershot: Avebury Publ., pp87–126
  • e. An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol 11, October, pp479–501

• 1996,
  • a. Uncertainty, the Race for Property Rights and Rent Dissipation Due to Judicial Legislation in Us Tort Law, Cultural Dynamics, 8: 333-351
  • b. avec David W. Rasmussen, Predatory Public Finance and the Origins of the War on Drugs, 1984-1989, The Independent Review, Vol 1, n°2, Fall
  • c. Are There Tradeoffs between Costs and Quality in the Privatization of Criminal Justice?, Journal of Security Administration, Vol 19, December, pp19–51
  • d. Privatization in Criminal Justice, Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Calif.: Independent Institute
  • e. Restitution in Theory and in Practice, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 12, Spring, pp75–98
  • f. "Can a Stateless Society Survive?", Formulations (publication de la Free Nation Foundation), Vol 3, n°11, spring

• 1997,
  • a. Institutions and the Spontaneous Evolution of Morality, In Gerard Radnitzky et H. Bouillon, dir., volume 3, Values and the Social Order, Aldershot: Avebury Publ., pp245-288
  • b. Arbitration, In: Baudouin Bouckaert et Gerry De Geest, dir., The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, London: Edward Elgar

• 1998,
  • a. "To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community Criminal Justice", New York: New York University Press for The Independent Institute
  • b. Crime Control Through Private Enterprise, The Independent Review, Vol 2, n°1, Winter

• 1999,
  • a. "An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 12, pp131–160
  • b. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Deterring drunk driving fatalities: An economics of crime perspective", International Review of Law and Economics, 19(2), juin, pp205–225
  • c. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Beer taxation and alcohol-related traffic fatalities", Southern Economic Journal, 66(2), octobre, pp214–249
  • d. "To Arbitrate or to Litigate: That is the Question", European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 8, pp91-151

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De 2000 à 2009

• 2000,
  • a. Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernetoria, Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 10, n°1, mars, pp3-31
  • b. "Rent Seeking on the Legal Frontier", In: Richard L. Stroup et Roger E. Meiners, dir., Cutting Green Tape: Toxic Pollutants, Environmental Regulation, and the Law, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, pp129–150
  • c. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Entrepreneurial police and drug enforcement policy", Public Choice, Vol 104, n°3-4, September, pp285–330
  • d. "Arbitration", In: Boudewijn Bouckaert et Gerrit De Geest, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", Vol 5, Chelthenham, UK and Brookfield, US, Edward Elgar

• 2001,
  • a. Endogenous Morality, Florida State University Working Paper, Présenté à la rencontre de l'Association Economique Américaine, Janvier
  • b. Law and Economics, Ch 26, In: William F. Shughart II et Laura Razzolini, Dir., The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, London: Edward Elgar, pp547–589
  • c. "Toxic Government. Government Claims Immunity from Tort Liability", The Freeman, Octobre, Vol 51, n°10

• 2002,
  • a. Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interestate Trucking, The Review of Austrian Economics, vol.15, numberes 2/3, pp229–255
  • b. Justice Without Government: The Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe and their Modern Counterparts, In: David Beito, Peter Gordon et Alexander Tabarrok, dir., The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society, Ch 6, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

• 2003, avec David W. Rasmussen et Paul R. Zimmerman, "Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor Monopolies", Public Choice, Vol 115, n°3–4, pp313–331

• 2004,
  • a. "Opportunities Forgone: The Unmeasurable Costs of Regulation", Journal of Private enterprise, Vol 19, n°2
  • b. "‘Globalization Through Human Action or Human Design?", Ama-gi. The Journal of the Hayek Sociey at the London School of Economics, vol 6, n°2, Spring, pp2-4

• 2005,
  • a. "The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads", The Independent Review, Vol 10, n°2, fall, pp165-194
  • b. "Regulation, more Regulation, Partial Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Disequilibrating Nature of a Rent-Seeking Society", In: Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, dir., "The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp105-143
  • c. "The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, Property Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution, and Enforcement without State Involvement", Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Vol 1, pp269-348

• 2007,
  • a. "Private policing and private roads: a coasian approach to drunk-driving policy", Economic Affairs 27:4, pp30–38
  • b. "Beliefs as Institution-Specific Rationalized Self-Interest", In: Hardy Bouillon et H. Kliemt, dir., "Ordered Anarchy: Jasay and his Surroundings", Aldershot, UK: Ashgate

• 2008,
  • a. "ILLICIT DRUGS", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp233-235
  • b. "LAW MERCHANT", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp286-287
  • c. "RESTITUTION FOR CRIME", In: Ronald Hamowy, dir., "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", Cato Institute - Sage Publications, pp427-429

Depuis 2010 =

• 2015, "The Evolution of Property Rights Systems", In: Peter Boettke et Christopher Coyne, dir., "The Oxford Handbook in Austrian Economics", Oxford University Press, pp296-323

• 2010,
  • a. "Another Path to Libertarianism", In: Walter Block, dir., I chose Liberty. Autobiographies of contemporary Libertarians, Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, Ch7, pp36-43
  • b. "It Takes Two Invisible Hands to Make a Market: Lex Mercatoria (Law Merchant) Always Emerges to Facilitate Emerging Market Activity“, Studies in Emergent Order, Vol 3, pp100-128

• 2011, "A Neo-Mengerian Examination of the Regulatory Process", Studies in Emergent Order, Vol 4, pp193-208

Littérature secondaire

• 1996, Mark Thornton, commentaire du livre de David W. Rasmussen et Bruce L. Benson, The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons, The Independent Review, Vol 1, n°2, Fall

• 1999, Laurent Carnis, commentaire du livre de Bruce L. Benson: To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice: Book Review, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2, 89-93

• 2001, Roy Halliday, commentaire du livre de Bruce Benson, "Serve and Protect", Formulations (publication de la Free Nation Foundation), n°29, Summer

• 2007, Armando Torrent Ruiz, ¿Justicia sin estado? ¿Es el estado un mal necesario?, commentaire du livre de Bruce L. Benson, Justicia sin Estado, Procesos de Mercado: Revista Europea de Economía Política, Vol 4, n°1, Printemps, pp257-332

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