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Bruce Benson (bibliographie)

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Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de Bruce Benson, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

De 1981 à 1989

  • 1981,
    • a. Corruption of Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights, 5, Journal of Libertarian Studies, pp305-311
    • b. Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by “High Demand” Legislators?, 48 Southern Economic Journal, juillet, pp68-77
    • c. "Land-Use Regulation: A Supply and Demand Analysis of Changing Property Rights", Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 5, n°4, Fall, pp435–451
  • 1983,
    • a. High Demand Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output, Public Finance Quarterly, Vol 11, pp259-281
    • b. The Economic Theory of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol 28, Winter, pp839-862
  • 1984,
    • a. Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective, Southern Economic Journal, 51, octobre, pp388–400
    • b. Rent Seeking as a Justification for Privatization, Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol 7, pp5-12
    • c. An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials, Cato Journal, Vol 8, pp139-163
    • d. avec Merle D. Faminow, Rent Seeking and Supply Management in Canada, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 32, pp548-558
  • 1985, avec John Baden, The political economy of governmental corruption: The logic of underground government, 14, Journal of Legal Studies, pp391-410
  • 1986,
    • a. avec Ronald N. Johnson, The Lagged Impact of State and Local Taxeson Economic Activity and Political Behavior.” Economic Inquiry, 24 (juillet 1986):389-401
    • b. Comment: The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Spring): pp299-427
    • c. avec Merle D. Faminow, Regulatory Transfers in Canadian-American Agriculture: The Case of Supply Management, Cato Journal, Vol 6, n°1, pp271-294
    • d. avec Melvin L. Greenhut, Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Antitrust: An Explanation of the Antitrust Paradox, In: Ronald E. Grieson, dir., Antitrust and Regulation, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, pp53-90
    • e. avec Ronald N. Johnson, Capital Formation and Interstate Tax Competition, In: Dwight Lee, Dir., Taxation and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Press, pp407-436
    • f. Guns for Protection, and other Private Sector Responses to the Government’s Failure to Control Crime, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 8, n°1
    • g. avec Merle D. Faminow, The Incentives to Organize and Demand Regulation: Two Ends Against the Middle, Economic Inquiry
  • 1987,
    • a. avec Ronald N. Johnson, Capital Formation and interstate Tax Competition, In: Dwight R. Lee, Dir., Taxation and the Deficit Economy, San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute
    • b. avec M. L. Greenhut et Randall Holcombe, Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox, Cato Journal 6, n°3, Winter, pp801-817
  • 1988,
    • a. Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 144, N°5, décembre, pp772-788
      • Repris en 2006, In: Edward P. Stringham, Dir., Anarchy and the Law. The Political Economy of Choice, Ch 38, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar
    • b. Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ Arising with Public Allocation Processes, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol 8, june, pp73–84
    • c. avec Jean Mitchell, Rent Seekers Who Demand Government Production: Bureaucratic Output and the Price of Complements, 56 Public Choice, pp3-16
  • 1989,
    • a. Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law without Government, Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol 9, n°1, Winter, pp1-26
    • b. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, Southern Economic Journal, 55, Jan, pp644-661
      • Repris en 1997, In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp165–189
      • Repris en 1999, In: Peter Boettke, Dir., The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek, Vol. 1: Politics, Chelteham: Elgar Reference Collection, pp433-450
    • c. Further Thoughts on Rent Seeking, Bureaucratic Output, and the Price of Complements, Public Choice, Vol 63, pp279-281

De 1990 à 1999

  • 1990,
    • a. "Customary Law with Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion", Journal of Libertarian Studies, 9: 25–45
    • b. "The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State", San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy
      • Nouvelle édition en 1991
      • Traduction en espagnol en 2000, Justicia sin Estado, Unión Editorial, Madrid
    • c. Commentaire du livre dirigé par James M. Buchanan, "Explorations into Constitutional Economics", Southern Economic Journal, Vol 56, n°4, April, pp1134-1135
  • 1991,
    • a. Reciprocal Exchange as the Basis for Recognition of Law: Examples from American History. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 10: 54–82
    • b. An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising Under Customary American Indian Law, 5,Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 5, pp65-89
    • c. avec David W. Rasmussen, The Relationship Between Illicit Drug Enforcement Policy and Property Crimes, Contemporary Policy Issues, Vol 9, Octobre, pp106–115
    • d. avec Jean B. Soper, George Norman, Melvin L. Greenhut, "Basing Point Pricing and Production Concentration", The Economic Journal, Vol 101, n°406, May, pp539-556
  • 1992,
    • a. "The Development of Criminal Law and its Enforcement: Public Interest or Political Transfers", Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 3, pp79-108
    • b. "Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp1-27
    • c. avec Kim Iljoong, David W. Rasmussen, Thomas W. Zuehlke, "Is Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or Drug Enforcement Policy?", Applied Economics, 24, July, pp679–692
    • d. "Illinois’ War on Drugs: Some Unintended Consequences", Heartland Policy Study, n°48, April, pp1–36
    • e. "Customary Indian Law: Two Case Studies", In: Terry L. Anderson, dir., "Property Rights and Indian Economies", Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp27-40
  • 1994,
    • a. Legal Philosophy’, In: Peter Boettke, Dir., The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics, London, Edward Elgar, 270-275
    • b. Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes and Makes Rights, 5, Constitutional Political Economy, pp129-158
    • c. "Are Public Goods Really Common Pools?, Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England", Economic Inquiry, Vol 32, n°2, avril, pp249-271
      • Repris en 2006, In: Edward P. Stringham, Dir., Anarchy and the Law. The Political Economy of Choice, Ch 34, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar
    • d. avec David W. Rasmussen, The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons, Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
    • e. Third Thoughts on Contracting Out, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 11, Fall, pp44-78
    • f. avec Iljoong Kim et David W. Rasmussen, Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Perspective on the Economics of Crime Literature’, Southern Economic Journal, Vol 61, pp161-168
    • g. avec David W. Rasmussen et Brent L. Mast, Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, Florida State University Working Paper
  • 1995,
    • a. Understanding Bureaucratic Behavior: Implications from the Public Choice Literature, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 8: 89–117
    • b. Toxic Torts by Government, in Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Independent Institute
    • c. avec David W. Rasmussen et David L. Sollars, Police Bureaucrats, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 Public Choice, avril, pp21-45
    • d. The Evolution of Values and Institutions in a Free Society: Underpinnings of a Market Economy, In Gerard Radnitzky et H. Bouillon, dir., volume 1, Values and the Social Order, Aldershot: Avebury Publ., pp87–126
    • e. An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol 11, October, pp479–501
  • 1996,
    • a. Uncertainty, the Race for Property Rights and Rent Dissipation Due to Judicial Legislation in Us Tort Law, Cultural Dynamics, 8: 333-351
    • b. avec David W. Rasmussen, Predatory Public Finance and the Origins of the War on Drugs, 1984-1989, The Independent Review, Vol 1, n°2, Fall
    • c. Are There Tradeoffs between Costs and Quality in the Privatization of Criminal Justice?, Journal of Security Administration, Vol 19, December, pp19–51
    • d. Privatization in Criminal Justice, Independent Policy Report, Oakland, Calif.: Independent Institute
    • e. "Restitution in Theory and in Practice", Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol 12, Spring, pp75–98
    • f. "Can a Stateless Society Survive?", Formulations (publication de la Free Nation Foundation), Vol 3, n°11, spring
  • 1997,
    • a. Institutions and the Spontaneous Evolution of Morality, In Gerard Radnitzky et H. Bouillon, dir., volume 3, Values and the Social Order, Aldershot: Avebury Publ., pp245-288
    • b. Arbitration, In: Baudouin Bouckaert et Gerry De Geest, dir., The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, London: Edward Elgar
  • 1998,
    • a. "To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community Criminal Justice", New York: New York University Press for The Independent Institute
    • b. Crime Control Through Private Enterprise, The Independent Review, Vol 2, n°1, Winter
    • c. avec Iljoong Kim, David W. Rasmussen, “Deterrence and Public Policy: Tradeoffs in the Allocation of Police Resources", International Review of Law & Economics, pp77-100
  • 1999,
    • a. "An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State", Review of Austrian Economics, Vol 12, pp131–160
    • b. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Deterring drunk driving fatalities: An economics of crime perspective", International Review of Law and Economics, 19(2), juin, pp205–225
    • c. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Beer taxation and alcohol-related traffic fatalities", Southern Economic Journal, 66(2), octobre, pp214–249
    • d. "To Arbitrate or to Litigate: That is the Question", European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 8, pp91-151

De 2000 à 2009

  • 2000,
    • a. Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernetoria, Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 10, n°1, mars, pp3-31
    • b. "Toxic Torts by Government", In: Roger Meiners, Richard Stroup, dir., "Cutting Green Tape: Toxic Pollutants, Environmental Regulation, and the Law", New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, pp83-98
    • c. "Rent Seeking on the Legal Frontier", In: Roger Meiners, Richard Stroup, dir., "Cutting Green Tape: Toxic Pollutants, Environmental Regulation, and the Law", New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, pp129–150
    • d. avec B. D. Mast et David W. Rasmussen, "Entrepreneurial police and drug enforcement policy", Public Choice, Vol 104, n°3-4, September, pp285–330
    • e. "Arbitration", In: Boudewijn Bouckaert et Gerrit De Geest, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", Vol 5, Chelthenham, UK and Brookfield, US, Edward Elgar
    • f. "Why crime declines", Ideas on liberty, January, Vol 50, n°1, pp22-25 [lire en ligne]
  • 2003, avec David W. Rasmussen et Paul R. Zimmerman, "Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor Monopolies", Public Choice, Vol 115, n°3–4, pp313–331
  • 2005,
    • a. "The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads", The Independent Review, Vol 10, n°2, fall, pp165-194
    • b. "Regulation, more Regulation, Partial Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Disequilibrating Nature of a Rent-Seeking Society", In: Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, dir., The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy" (Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp105-143
    • c. "The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, Property Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution, and Enforcement without State Involvement", Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Vol 1, pp269-348
  • 2007,
    • a. "Private policing and private roads: a coasian approach to drunk-driving policy", Economic Affairs 27:4, pp30–38
    • b. "Beliefs as Institution-Specific Rationalized Self-Interest", In: Hardy Bouillon et H. Kliemt, dir., "Ordered Anarchy: Jasay and his Surroundings", Aldershot, UK: Ashgate

De 2010 à 2019

  • 2015, "The Evolution of Property Rights Systems", In: Peter Boettke et Christopher Coyne, dir., "The Oxford Handbook in Austrian Economics", Oxford University Press, pp296-323
  • 2017, "Customary commercial law, credibility, contracting, and credit in the high Middle Ages", In: Peter J. Boettke, Todd Zywicki, dir., "Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics", Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp129-177 (en)
  • 2019,
    • a. "Customary Law", In: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", New York: Springer, pp514-523
    • b. "Lex Mercatoria", In: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello, dir., "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics", New York: Springer, pp1298-1303


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