Elias L. Khalil

Elias Lafi Khalil est professeur agrégé au département d'économie à la Monash University (Australie).

Les recherches d'Elias L. Khalil portent sur le problème de la créativité, qui sous-entendent les recherches sur l'imagination, sur l'innovation, sur l'entrepreneuriat et sur la nature des organisations. La théorie standard de la rationalité a été très efficace dans l'explication du fonctionnement du marché et des structures de gouvernance. Cependant, elle n'est pas d'un grand apport quand il s'agit de l'étude sur la créativité. L'accent mis sur la créativité a conduit Elias Khalil à étudier des questions qui définissent l'orientation de l'économie comportementale.

L'approche d'Elias L. Khalil porte sur les questions qui sont importantes pour l'économie institutionnelle, sur la théorie néo-darwinienne de l'évolution, sur les théories de la rationalité procédurale à la Herbert Simon et sur la formation des croyances à la Douglass North et sur la confiance. Il est également spécialiste de l'histoire de la pensée économique avec un profond intérêt pour Adam Smith.

Bibliographie

• 1987, commentaire de la traduction anglaise du livre de Karel Engliš, An Essay on Economic Systems: A Teleological Approach, Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol 19, n°3, pp98-100

• 1995,
  • a. Neoclassical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking, In: Ron Blackwell, Jaspal Chatha et Edward J. Nell, dir., Economics as Worldly Philosophy, London, Macmilan
  • b. "Organizations versus Institutions”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151(3), pp445-466
  • c. Institutional theory of the firm? Extension and limitation, Review of Political Economy, Vol 7, n°1, pp43-51

• 1996, "Friedrich Hayek's Darwinian Theory of Evolution of Institutions: Two Problems", Australian Economic Papers, June, Vol. 35, N°66, pp183-201

• 1997,
  • a. “Evolutionary Biology and Evolutionary Economics”, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 8:4, pp221-244
  • b. “Friedrich Hayek’s Theory of Spontaneous Order: Two Problems”, Constitutional Political Economy, 8:4, pp301-317
  • c. “Etzioni versus Becker: Do Moral Sentiments Differ from Ordinary Tastes?”, De Economist, December, 145:4, pp491-520
  • d. “Chaos Theory versus Heisenberg’s Uncertainty: Risk, Uncertainty and Economic Theory”, American Economist, Fall, 41:2, pp27-40
  • e. “Biological Metaphors, Socio-Economic Theory and Reductionism”, Economic Issues, September, 2:2, pp45-57
  • f. “Is the Firm an Individual?”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, July, 21:4, pp519-544
  • g. “The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, June, 153:2, pp411-415
  • h. “Buridan’s Ass, Uncertainty, Risk, and Self-Competition: A Theory of Entrepreneurship”, Kyklos, 50:2, pp147-163
  • i. “Symbolic Inputs: Positional, Reference and Publicity Goods”, Finnish Economic Papers, Spring, 10:1, pp20-34
  • j. “Economics, Biology, and Naturalism: Three Problems Concerning the Question of Individuality”, Biology & Philosophy, April, 12:2, pp185-206
  • k. “Production and Environmental Resources: A Prelude to an Evolutionary Framework”, Southern Economic Journal, April, 63:4, pp929-946

• 1998,
  • a. “Is Justice the Primary Feature of the State? Adam Smith’s Critique of Social Contract Theory”, European Journal of Law and Economics, November, 6:3, pp215-230
  • b. “The Five Careers of the Biological Metaphor in Economic Theory”, Journal of Socio-Economics, Spring, 27:1, pp29-52

• 1999,
  • a. “Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen’s Notion of Commitment”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, December, 40:4, pp373-386
  • b. “Two Kinds of Order: Thoughts on the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Socio-Economics, Spring, 28:2, pp157-173
  • c. “Institutions, Naturalism and Evolution”, Review of Political Economy, January, 11:1, pp61-81
  • d. “The Janus Hypothesis”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Winter, 21:2, pp315-342

• 2000,
  • a. Making Sense of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand: Beyond Pareto Optimality and Unintended Consequences, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, march, Vol 22, n°1, pp49-63
  • b. “Survival of the Most Foolish of Fools: The Limits of Evolutionary Selection Theory”, Journal of Bioeconomics, 2:3, pp203-220
  • c. “Types of Metaphor and Identificational Slips in Economic Discourse”, Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, 18A, pp83-105
  • d. “Beyond Natural Selection and Divine Intervention: The Lamarckian Implication of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10:4, pp373-393
  • e. “Symbolic Products: Prestige, Pride and Identity Goods”, Theory and Decision, August, 49:1, pp53-77

• 2001, “Adam Smith and Three Theories of Altruism”, Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review, 67:4, pp421-435

• 2002,
  • a. Information, knowledge and the close of Friedrich Hayek's system, Eastern Economic journal, summer, Vol 28, n°3, pp319-341
  • b. “Is Adam Smith Liberal?”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, December, 158:4, pp664-694

• 2003,
  • a. dir., Trust, UK: Edward Elgar Publishers, Aldershot
  • b. "A transactional view of entrepreneurship: a deweyan approach", Journal of Economic Methodology, vol 10, n°2, Juin, pp161-179

• 2004,
  • a. dir., "Dewey, Pragmatism and Economic Methodology", New York: Routledge
  • b. “The Gift Paradox: Complex Selves and Symbolic Goods”,, Review of Social Economy, September, 62:3, pp379-392
  • c. “The Three Laws of Thermodynamics and the Theory of Production”, Journal of Economic Issues, March, 38:1, pp201-226
  • d. “What is Altruism?”, Journal of Economic Psychology, February, 25:1, pp

• 2005, “An Anatomy of Authority: Adam Smith as Political Theorist”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, January, 29:1, pp57-71

• 2007,
  • a. “The Problem of Creativity: Distinguishing Technological Action and Cognitive Action”, Revue de Philosophie Économique, December, 8:2, pp33-69
  • b. avec Colin Jevons et Michael T. Ewing, “Managing Brand Demise”, Journal of General Management, Summer, 32:4, pp73-81

• 2009,
  • a. avec Michael T. Ewing et Colin P. Jevons, “Brand Death: A Developmental Model of Senescence”, Journal of Business Research, March, 62:3, pp332-338
  • b. “Natural Selection and Rational Decision: Two Concepts of Optimization”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, June, 19:3, pp417-435

• 2010,
  • a. "The Mirror Neuron Paradox: How Far is Understanding from Mimicking?", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
  • b. "Are Plants Rational?", Biological Theory, 5:1, pp53–66
  • c. "The Bayesian Fallacy: Distinguishing Internal Motivations and Religious Beliefs from Other Beliefs", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, August, 75:2, pp268-280
  • d. "Adam Smith's Concept of Self-Command as a Solution to Dynamic Inconsistency and the Commitment Problem", Economic Inquiry, January, 48:1, pp177-191
  • e. avec Alain Marciano, "The Equivalence of Neo-Darwinism and Walrasian Equilibrium: In Defense of Organismus economicus", Biology & Philosophy, Vol 25, n°2, pp229-248

Accédez d'un seul coup d’œil au portail économie.