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Thomas W. Hazlett
Thomas W. Hazlett est professeur de droit et d'économie à l'Université George Mason School of Law. Il est également chroniqueur pour le New Technology Policy Forum, organisé par le Financial Times. Auparavant, il appartenait au corps professoral de l'Université de Californie à Davis, Université de Columbia, et de la Wharton School, et en 1991-1992, il occupait les fonctions de chef économiste à la Federal Communications Commission.
Thomas W. Hazlett a publié de nombreux articles dans des revues universitaires sur l'économie de l'information et sur les droits de propriété de la bande de fréquence. Il a fourni un témoignage d'expert à l'Etat fédéral et auprès des tribunaux, des organismes de réglementation, des comités du Congrès, des gouvernements étrangers et des organisations internationales.
Publications
- 1985, Private Contracting versus Public Regulation as a Solution to the Natural Monopoly Problem, In: Robert W. Poole, dir., Unnatural Monopolies: The Case for Deregulating Public Utilities, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books
- 1986, REGULATION AND THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION:INTRODUCTION. Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol 4, n°2, pp52–53
- 1987, The role of property rights in the positive theory of monopoly, Managerial and Decision Economics, 8, pp201–212
- 1988, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF APARTHEID, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol 6, n°4, octobre, pp85–104
- 1990,
- a. Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy, Yale Journal on Regulation, 7
- b. “The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum”, Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1), pp133–175
- 1997, avec Matthew L. Spitzer, Public Policy Toward Cable Television, MIT Press
- 1998,
- a. Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for "Open Access" to Radio Waves, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 41, n°2, Part 2, The Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum: A Conference Sponsored by the Program on Telecommunications Policy, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, Davis (Oct.), pp805-820
- b. Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 41, n° 2, Part 2, The Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum: A Conference Sponsored by the Program on Telecommunications Policy, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, Davis (Oct.), pp529-575
- c. The Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum: Introduction, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol 41, October, part 2, pp521-522
- 2000, avec George Bittlingmayer, DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust Action against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 55
- 2001, “The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Spring, pp335-567
- 2003, “Liberalizing U.S. Radio Spectrum Allocation”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol 27, 485 (Aug)
- 2006,
- a. avec Giancarlo Ibárgüen et Wayne A. Leighton, Property Rights to Radio Spectrum in Guatemala and El Salvador: An Experiment in Liberalization, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 10 mars
- b. “Property Rights and Wireless License Values”, Journal of Law & Economics,
- c. avec Roberto Muñoz, “What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design”
- d. avec Matthew L. Spitzer, “Advanced Wireless Technologies and Public Policy”, Southern California Law Review, Vol 79
- 2008, Property Rights and Wireless License Values, The Journal of Law and Economics, 51:3, pp563-598
- 2009, avec Roberto E. Muñoz, A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol 40, n°3, pp424-454
Littérature secondaire
- 1998, Ronald Coase, “Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?”, J. Law & Econ., Vol 41, Oct., pp577-580
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