Jerry Ellig

Jerry Ellig ou Jerome Ellig, né en 1962, est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à la théorie de la firme dès 1993. Il a fait partie de l'équipe de Don Lavoie au "Program on Social and Organizational Learning" à l'université George Mason.

Il est proche de l'école du Public Choice et de l'école autrichienne d'économie. Il a écrit notamment sur la déréglementation du secteur de l'électricité.

Bibliographie

• 1988,
  • a. avec Jack High, The Private Supply of Education, In: Tyler Cowen, dir., The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination, Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press
  • b. “The Case of the Interstate Pipeline”, Working Paper. George Mason University: Center for Market Process

• 1989, Consumers on Hold, Reason, juillet, p. 36-37
• 1991, Endogenous Change and the Economic Theory of Regulation, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 3, no. 3 (septembre, pp265-274
• 1992, Untwisting the Strands of Chicago Antitrust, The Antitrust Bulletin, 37:4, Winter, pp863-879
• 1993,
  • a. avec Michael Giberson, “Scale, Scope and Regulation in the Texas Gas Transmission Industry”, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 5, no. 1 (mars): 79-90
  • b. avec Wayne Gable, Introduction to Market Based Management. Fairfax, VA: Center for Market Processes
  • c. Internal Pricing for Corporate Services, Working Paper in Market-Based Management, Centre for the Study of Market Processes, George Mason University

• 1994,
  • a. The Economics of Regulatory Takings, In: Roger Clegg, dir., Regulatory Takings: Restoring Private Property Rights
  • b. The Incredible Ticket Machine, The Freeman, Mai, Vol 44, n°5
  • c. avec Alison E. Woodward et Tom R. Burns, Municipal entrepreneurship and energy policy : a five nation study of politics, innovation, and social change, Yverdon, Switzerland ; Langhorne, Pa. : Gordon and Breach

• 1995,
  • a. From Austrian Economics to Market-Based Management, The Journal of Private Enterprise XI(1): 31-45
  • b. Why Do Regulators Regulate? The Case of the Southern California Gas Market, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 7, no. 3, mai, pp293-308
  • c. avec Don Lavoie, Governments, Firms, and the Impossibility of Central Planning, In: Pål Foss, dir, Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company
  • d. avec Tyler Cowen, Market-Based Management at Koch Industries: Discovery, Dissemination, and Integration of Knowledge, Competitive Intelligence Review, Vol 6, n°4, pp4-13

• 1996, Organizational Economics and the Market‐Based Management Framework: Toward a Common Research Agenda, Journal of Private Enterprise 12, no. 1 (Fall): pp. 73–88

• 1997,
  • a. avec Robert Crandall, dir., Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry (electricity), Center for Market Processes
  • b. avec Dan Lin, A taxonomy of dynamic competition theories, In: Jerry Ellig et Robert Crandall, dir., Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry (electricity), Center for Market Processes
• 2001,
  • a. Dir., Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues. New York: Cambridge University Press,
  • b. Internal Markets and the Theory of the Firm, Managerial and Decision Economics, 22. (August): pp. 222–237
• 2002, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 21, no. 2 (mars 2002): 143-167
• 2004,
  • a. avec Alan Wiseman, Interstate Trade Barriers and Potential Regulatory Competition: The Case of Virginia's Direct Wine Shipping Ban, Journal of Private enterprise, Volume 19, n°2
  • b. avec Alan Wiseman, Market and Nonmarket Barriers to Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia, Business and Politics, 6 (2): Article 4

• 2005,
  • a. Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications and Broadband Regulations, 58, Federal Communications Law Journal 17 (Feb
  • b. Intercarrier Compensation and Consumer Welfare, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 97, 98–99
  • c. avec Robert W. Crandall, Texas Telecommunications: EVERYTHING’S DYNAMIC EXCEPT THE PRICING, Texas Pub. Policy Found., 40
• 2006,
  • a. avec James Taylor, The Irony of Transparency: Unintended Consequences of Wireless Truth-in-Billing, Loyola Consumer Law Review 19:1
  • b. avec Alastair Walling, Regulatory Status of VoIP in the Post-Brand X World, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 128–29

• 2007,
  • a. avec Joseph P. Rotondi, Outcomes and Alternatives for Universal Telecommunications Service: A Case Study of Texas, Texas Review of Law and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall
  • b. avec Alan E. Wiseman, The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups and the Commerce Clause, Journal of Politics. 69 (3): 859-875
  • c. avec Alan E. Wiseman, Ohio’s Direct Shipping Law: New Regulations Still Discriminate, and Price Competition May Result, Wines & Vines, 88(12): 82
  • d. avec Alan E. Wiseman, Uncorking E-Commerce: Update, Regulation, 30 (2): 6-7

Littérature secondaire

• 2003, George Bittlingmayer, commentaire du livre de Jerry Ellig, dir., Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 1, Mar., pp240-241

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