Gary Libecap

Gary Libecap est professeur d'économie, de Droit et de gestion environnementale à l'université de californie, à Santa-Barbara. Ses recherches se concentrent sur les droits de propriété et sur le comportement économique dans l'utilisation des ressources naturelles et sur les effets immpliqués sur la qualité de l'environnement. En utilisant des données historiques et contemporaines, il a analysé les différents droits de propriété et les dispositions réglementaires concernant le "Common Pool".

Ses derniers travaux portent sur la cartographie des propriétés privées, sur les revendications de propriétés se chevauchant intégrant le problème du marquage de la frontière et des formes géométriques des surfaces.

Publications

• 1978, The Evolution of Private Mining Rights: Nevada's Comstock Lode. New York: Arno Press/New York Times

• 1981, Locking Up the Range: Federal Land Use Controls and Grazing. Cambridge: Ballinger

• 1983, Economic Interests of Grazing Permittees, In: J. Smits, dir., Privatizing the Public Lands, Public Lands Council, pp55-57

• 1984, avec Steven Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, American Economic Review, 74: 87–98

• 1985, avec Steven Wiggins, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, 75 (3), pp368-85

• 1989, Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press
  • Traduction en chinois en 1998, China Social Sciences Publishing House, Beijing

• 1992, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust, Economic Inquiry, April

• 1994,
  • a. avec Ronald Johnson, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change, University of Chicago Press and NBER
  • b. avec Claudia Goldin, dir. The Political Economy of Regulation: An Historical Analysis of Government and the Economy, University of Chicago Press and NBER
  • c. avec Bernardo Mueller, Lee Alston et Robert SchneiderLand, Property Rights, and Privatization in Brazil, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Special Issue
  • d. The Conditions for Successful Collective Action, Journal of Theoretical Politics, pp569-598
    • Repris In: Robert Keohane et Elinor Ostrom, dir., Local Commons and Global Interdependence, Sage Publications
  • e. avec Ronald Johnson, Patronage to Merit and Control of the Federal Government Labor Force, Explorations in Economic History

• 1995,
  • a. avec R. N. Johnson, Courts, A Protected Bureaucracy, and Reinventing Government, Arizona Law Review
  • b. avec Lee Alston et Robert Schneider, Property Rights and the Preconditions for Markets: The Case of the Amazon Frontier, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
  • c. avec Elizabeth Hoffman, The Failure of Government-Sponsored Cartelization and the Development of Federal Farm Policy, Economic Inquiry

• 1996,
  • a. Environmental Regulation and Federalism, Arizona Law Review
  • b. avec Lee Alston et Robert Schneider, The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

• 1998,
  • a. Unitization, In: Peter Newman, dir., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law
  • b. Common Property, In: Peter Newman, dir., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law

• 1999,
  • a. avec Lee Alston et Bernardo Mueller, Titles, Conflict and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier, University of Michigan Press
  • b. avec James Smith, The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
  • c. avec Lee Alston et Bernardo Mueller, A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy in Brazil, Environment and Development Economics, 4, pp135-160

• 2000,
  • a. avec Price Fishback et Ed Zajac, dir., Public Choice Essays in Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock. Kluwer Academic
  • b. avec Barbara Alexander, The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal’s Agricultural and Industrial Programs, Explorations in Economic History
  • c. avec Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller, Property Rights to Land and Land Reform: Legal Inconsistencies and the Sources of Violent Conflict in the Brazilian Amazon, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

• 2001,
  • a. The Problem of an Autonomous Bureaucracy in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the American Experience, Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines
  • b. avec James Smith, Regulatory Remedies to the Common Pool: The Limits to Oil Field Unitization, Energy Journal
  • c. avec Ronald N. Johnson, Information Distortion and Competitive Remedies in Government Transfer Programs: The Case of Ethanol, The Economics of Governance

• 2002,
  • a. avec Zeynep Hansen, Rain Follows the Plow@ and Dryfarming Doctrine: The Climate Information Problem and Homestead Failure in the Upper Great Plains, 1890-1925, Journal of Economic History
  • b. Learning About the Weather: Dryfarming Doctrine and Homestead Failure in Eastern Montana, 1900-1925, Montana: The Magazine of Western History

• 2003,
  • a. avec Ronald Johnson, Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability Under Majority Rule, Economic Inquiry
  • b. avec James Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, Journal of Legal Studies
  • c. avec Alberta Charney, The Contribution of Entrepreneurship Education: A Case Study, International Journal of Entrepreneurship Education

• 2004,
  • a. avec Zeynep Hansen, Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, Journal of Political Economy
  • b. avec Zeynep Hansen, The Allocation of Property Rights to Land: U.S. Land Policy and Farm Failure in the Great Plains, Explorations in Economic History
  • c. avec Zeynep Hansen, The Allocation of Property Rights to Land: U.S. Land Policy and Farm Failure in the Great Plains, Explorations in Economic History

• 2005, “Chinatown” Owens Valley and Western Water Re-Allocation: Getting the Record Straight and What It Means for Water Markets, Texas Law Review

• 2007, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, Journal of Economic History, 67(2):257-91

• 2009,
  • a. avec Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, In: Kenneth Ayotte et Henry E. Smith, dir., Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law, Research Handbooks in Law and Economics, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
  • b. avec Dean Lueck, The demarcation of land and the role of coordinating Institutions, NBER Working Paper 14942, mai

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