Vous pouvez contribuer simplement à Wikibéral. Pour cela, demandez un compte à adminwiki@liberaux.org. N'hésitez pas !


Différences entre les versions de « Jerry Ellig »

De Wikiberal
Aller à la navigation Aller à la recherche
m
m
Ligne 24 : Ligne 24 :
** b. [http://www.mbminstitute.org/uploads/Internal%20Markets%20and%20Theory%20of%20the%20Firm%202001.pdf Internal Markets and the Theory of the Firm], Managerial and Decision Economics, 22. (August): pp. 222–237
** b. [http://www.mbminstitute.org/uploads/Internal%20Markets%20and%20Theory%20of%20the%20Firm%202001.pdf Internal Markets and the Theory of the Firm], Managerial and Decision Economics, 22. (August): pp. 222–237
* [[2002]], Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 21, no. 2 (mars 2002): 143-167
* [[2002]], Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 21, no. 2 (mars 2002): 143-167
* [[2004]], avec Alan Wiseman, [http://www.apee.org/pdf/Ellig-Wi19-2.pdf Interstate Trade Barriers and Potential Regulatory Competition: The Case of Virginia's Direct Wine Shipping Ban], Journal of Private enterprise, Volume 19, n°2
* [[2004]],  
** a. avec Alan Wiseman, [http://www.apee.org/pdf/Ellig-Wi19-2.pdf Interstate Trade Barriers and Potential Regulatory Competition: The Case of Virginia's Direct Wine Shipping Ban], Journal of Private enterprise, Volume 19, n°2
** b. avec Alan Wiseman, Market and Nonmarket Barriers to Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia, Business and Politics, 6 (2): Article 4
 
* [[2005]],  
* [[2005]],  
** a. Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications and Broadband Regulations, 58, Federal Communications Law Journal 17 (Feb
** a. Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications and Broadband Regulations, 58, Federal Communications Law Journal 17 (Feb

Version du 14 mai 2009 à 09:22

Jerry Ellig est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à la théorie de la firme dès 1993. Il est proche de l'école du Public Choice et de l'école autrichienne d'économie. Il a écrit notamment sur la déréglementation du secteur de l'électricité.

Bibliographie

  • 1989, Consumers on Hold, Reason, juillet, p. 36-37
  • 1991, Endogenous Change and the Economic Theory of Regulation, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 3, no. 3 (septembre, pp265-274
  • 1992, Untwisting the Strands of Chicago Antitrust, The Antitrust Bulletin, 37:4, Winter, pp863-879
  • 1993,
    • a. avec Michael Giberson, “Scale, Scope and Regulation in the Texas Gas Transmission Industry”, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 5, no. 1 (mars): 79-90
    • b. avec Wayne Gable, Introduction to Market Based Management. Fairfax, VA: Center for Market Processes
    • c. Internal Pricing for Corporate Services, Working Paper in Market-Based Management, Centre for the Study of Market Processes, George Mason University
  • 1994, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, In: Roger Clegg, dir., Regulatory Takings: Restoring Private Property Rights
  • 1995,
    • a. From Austrian Economics to Market-Based Management, The Journal of Private Enterprise XI(1): 31-45
    • b. Why Do Regulators Regulate? The Case of the Southern California Gas Market, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 7, no. 3, mai, pp293-308
    • c. avec Don Lavoie, Governments, Firms, and the Impossibility of Central Planning, In: Pål Foss, dir, Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company
  • 1996, Organizational Economics and the Market‐Based Management Framework: Toward a Common Research Agenda, Journal of Private Enterprise 12, no. 1 (Fall): pp. 73–88
  • 1996, avec Tyler Cowen, Market-Based Management at Koch Industries: Discovery, Dissemination, and Integration of Knowledge, Competitive Intelligence Review 6: 4-13
  • 1997,
    • a. avec Robert Crandall, dir., Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry (electricity), Center for Market Processes
    • b. avec Dan Lin, A taxonomy of dynamic competition theories, In: Jerry Ellig et Robert Crandall, dir., Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric Industry (electricity), Center for Market Processes
  • 2001,
    • a. Dir., Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues. New York: Cambridge University Press,
    • b. Internal Markets and the Theory of the Firm, Managerial and Decision Economics, 22. (August): pp. 222–237
  • 2002, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, Journal of regulatory economics, Vol. 21, no. 2 (mars 2002): 143-167
  • 2004,

Littérature secondaire

  • 2003, George Bittlingmayer, commentaire du livre de Jerry Ellig, dir., Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 1, Mar., pp240-241


5179-pittux-Stylo.png Accédez d'un seul coup d’œil au portail des grands auteurs et penseurs du libéralisme.


Adam Smith.jpg Accédez d'un seul coup d’œil au portail économie.