Fred S. McChesney

Fred S. McChesney
économiste
Dates	né en 1948
Tendance
Nationalité	{{{nationalité}}}
Articles internes	Autres articles sur Fred S. McChesney
Citation
Interwikis sur Fred S. McChesney

Fred S. McChesney est un économiste américain, spécialiste de la dérégulation et des politiques Anti-trust. Il est né le 19 novembre 1948 (Washington, D.C.). Il est diplômé d'économie de l'université de Virginie en 1982 (Ph.D). Il est spécialiste de l'école du Public Choice et des politiques anti-trust.

Bibliographie

• 1977, “On the Procedural Superiority of a Civil Law System,” 30 Kyklos 507
• 1986, “Prohibitions on Volunteer Fire-Fighting in Nineteenth Century America: A Property Rights Perspective,” 15 Journal of Legal Studies 69
  • Repris en 1998, In: The Foundations of Regulatory Economics, R. Ekelund, ed., Edward Elgar
• 1987,
  • a. Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, Journal of Legal Studies, 16: 101–118
  • b. avec Richard L. Doernberg, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71, Minn. L. Rev. 913
  • c. avec Richard L. Doernberg, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891
  • d. Sensationalism, Newspaper Profits and the Marginal Value of Watergate, Economic Inquiry 25:135–44
• 1990,
  • a. Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Land Ownership, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 Journal of Legal Studies 297
    • Repris en 1992, In: Terry L. Anderson, dir., Property Rights, Constitutions and Indian Economies
  • b. avec Malcolm B. Coate et Richard S. Higgins, Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, Journal of Law and Economics, 33, October, pp463-482

• 1991,
  • a. Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, Cato Journal, Vol 10, n°3, winter, pp775-798
  • b. Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 20, n°1 (Jan.), pp73-90
  • c. Be True to Your School: Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, Cato Journal, 10, pp775–798

• 1992, avec Malcolm B. Coate, Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforcement of the Merger Guidelines, Economic Inquiry, 30, April, pp277-293

• 1993, “Boxed In: Economists and Benefits from Crime”, International Review of Law and Economics, (13): 225-231
• 1995, William F. Shughart II, The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press
• 1996,
  • a. An Introduction to Alchian’s Principles of Professional Advancement, 34 Economic Inquiry, 519
  • b. The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust, 17 Managerial and Decision Economics 119
• 1997, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
• 1998, “The Demand for and Supply of Economics in Modern Antitrust,” in Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust
• 1998, High Plains Drifters: Politicians Lucrative Protection Racket, The Freeman, 48:1, January, pp4-9
• 1999, “Economics versus Politics in Antitrust,” 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 133
• 1999, “Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” 50 Case Western Reserve Law Review, 245
• 2003, “Government as Definer of Property Rights: Tragedy Exiting the Commons?” in Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (T. Anderson & F. McChesney, eds.)
• 2003, Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust,” In: Kluwer Encyclopedia of Public Choice (C. Rowley, ed., 2003).

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