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Fred S. McChesney
Révision datée du 14 avril 2008 à 12:13 par Ludovic Sesim (discussion | contributions)
Fred S. McChesney | |||||
économiste | |||||
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Dates | né en 1948 | ||||
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Nationalité | {{{nationalité}}} | ||||
Articles internes | Autres articles sur Fred S. McChesney | ||||
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Interwikis sur Fred S. McChesney | |||||
Fred S. McChesney est un économiste américain, spécialiste de la dérégulation et des politiques Anti-trust. Il est né le 19 novembre 1948 (Washington, D.C.). Il est diplômé d'économie de l'université de Virginie en 1982 (Ph.D).
Bibliographie
- 1977, “On the Procedural Superiority of a Civil Law System,” 30 Kyklos 507
- 1986, “Prohibitions on Volunteer Fire-Fighting in Nineteenth Century America: A Property Rights Perspective,” 15 Journal of Legal Studies 69
- Repris en 1998, In: The Foundations of Regulatory Economics, R. Ekelund, ed., Edward Elgar
- 1987,
- a. Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, Journal of Legal Studies, 16: 101–118
- b. avec Richard L. Doernberg, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71, Minn. L. Rev. 913
- c. avec Richard L. Doernberg, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891
- 1990, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Land Ownership, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 Journal of Legal Studies 297
- Repris en 1992, In: Property Rights, Constitutions and Indian Economies, T. Anderson, ed.
- 1991,
- a. Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, Cato Journal 10
- b. Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan.), pp73-90
- 1993, “Boxed In: Economists and Benefits from Crime”, International Review of Law and Economics, (13): 225-231
- 1996, “An Introduction to Alchian’s Principles of Professional Advancement,” 34 Economic Inquiry, 519
- 1996, “The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust,” 17 Managerial and Decision Economics 119
- 1997, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- 1998, “The Demand for and Supply of Economics in Modern Antitrust,” in Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust
- 1998, High Plains Drifters: Politicians Lucrative Protection Racket, The Freeman, 48:1, January, pp4-9
- 1999, “Economics versus Politics in Antitrust,” 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 133
- 1999, “Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” 50 Case Western Reserve Law Review, 245
- 2003, “Government as Definer of Property Rights: Tragedy Exiting the Commons?” in Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (T. Anderson & F. McChesney, eds.)
- 2003, Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust,” In: Kluwer Encyclopedia of Public Choice (C. Rowley, ed., 2003).
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